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Abstract
Embedded systems were for a long time, single-purpose and closed systems, characterized
by hardware resource constraints and real-time requirements. Nowadays, their functionality is
ever-growing, coupled with an increasing complexity and heterogeneity. Embedded applications
increasingly demand employment of general-purpose operating systems (GPOSs) to handle op-
erator interfaces and general-purpose computing tasks, while simultaneously ensuring the strict
timing requirements. Virtualization, which enables multiple operating systems (OSs) to run on
top of the same hardware platform, is gaining momentum in the embedded systems arena,
driven by the growing interest in consolidating and isolating multiple and heterogeneous environ-
ments. The penalties incurred by classic virtualization approaches is pushing research towards
hardware-assisted solutions. Among the existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies for
virtualization, ARM TrustZone technology is gaining momentum due to the supremacy and lower
cost of TrustZone-enabled processors.
Programmable system-on-chips (SoCs) are becoming leading players in the embedded sys-
tems space, because the combination of a plethora of hard resources with programmable logic
enables the efficient implementation of systems that perfectly fit the heterogeneous nature of
embedded applications. Moreover, novel disruptive approaches make use of field-programmable
gate array (FPGA) technology to enhance virtualization mechanisms.
This master’s thesis proposes a hardware-software co-design framework for easing the econ-
omy of addressing the new generation of embedded systems requirements. ARM TrustZone is
exploited to implement the root-of-trust of a virtualization-based architecture that allows the execu-
tion of a GPOS side-by-side with a real-time OS (RTOS). RTOS services were offloaded to hardware,
so that it could present simultaneous improvements on performance and determinism. Instead
of focusing in a concrete application, the goal is to provide a complete framework, specifically tai-
lored for Zynq-base devices, that developers can use to accelerate a bunch of distinct applications
across different embedded industries.
vii

Resumo
Os sistemas embebidos foram, durante muitos anos, sistemas com um simples e único
propósito, caracterizados por recursos de hardware limitados e com cariz de tempo real. Hoje
em dia, o número de funcionalidades começa a escalar, assim como o grau de complexidade
e heterogeneidade. As aplicações embebidas exigem cada vez mais o uso de sistemas opera-
tivos (OSs) de uso geral (GPOS) para lidar com interfaces gráficas e tarefas de computação de
propósito geral. Porém, os seus requisitos primordiais de tempo real mantém-se. A virtualização
permite que vários sistemas operativos sejam executados na mesma plataforma de hardware.
Impulsionada pelo crescente interesse em consolidar e isolar ambientes múltiplos e heterogé-
neos, a virtualização tem ganho uma crescente relevância no domínio dos sistemas embebidos.
As adversidades que advém das abordagens de virtualização clássicas estão a direcionar estu-
dos no âmbito de soluções assistidas por hardware. Entre as tecnologias comerciais existentes, a
tecnologia ARM TrustZone está a ganhar muita relevância devido à supremacia e ao menor custo
dos processadores que suportam esta tecnologia.
Plataformas hibridas, que combinam processadores com lógica programável, estão em cres-
cente penetração no domínio dos sistemas embebidos pois, disponibilizam um enorme conjunto
de recursos que se adequam perfeitamente à natureza heterogénea dos sistemas atuais. Além
disso, existem soluções recentes que fazem uso da tecnologia de FPGA para melhorar os mecan-
ismos de virtualização.
Esta dissertação propõe uma framework baseada em hardware-software de modo a cumprir
os requisitos da nova geração de sistemas embebidos. A tecnologia TrustZone é explorada para
implementar uma arquitetura que permite a execução de um GPOS lado-a-lado com um sis-
temas operativo de tempo real (RTOS). Os serviços disponibilizados pelo RTOS são migrados
para hardware, para melhorar o desempenho e determinismo do OS. Em vez de focar numa
aplicação concreta, o objetivo é fornecer uma framework especificamente adaptada para dispos-
itivos baseados em System-on-chips Zynq, de forma a que developers possam usar para acelerar
um vasto número de aplicações distintas em diferentes setores.
ix
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1. Introduction
Embedded systems were, for a long time single-purpose systems, showing simple function-
ality and interfaces and little to no need for communication channels or compatibility with other
devices, characterized by constraints hardware resources and real-time requirements. Therefore,
they used to have reduced software complexity. Nowadays, their functionality is ever-growing,
coupled with an increasing complexity that is associated with a higher number of bugs and vul-
nerabilities. Moreover, the pervasive connectivity of these devices in the modern Internet of Things
(IoT) era significantly increases their attack surface [POP+17]. Due to their myriad of applications
and domains, ranging from consumer electronics to aerospace control systems, there is an in-
creasing reliance on embedded devices that often have access to sensitive data and perform
safety-critical operations [Hei11, BBO+16].
Platform virtualization, which enables multiple operating systems (OSes) to run on top of
the same hardware platform, is gaining momentum in the embedded systems arena, driven by
the growing interest in consolidating and isolating heterogeneous environments [Hei11]. This
technology is well established in the server and desktop domains, providing benefits such as
service consolidation, load balancing and power management. While in industrial control or
automotive, systems virtualization has been used to integrate real-time control functionalities with
high-level or infotainment environments [BBO+16], in aeronautics and aerospace, virtualization
provides isolation for safety-critical components [PTM16b]. Without virtualization these systems
would commonly be distributed across multiple physically interconnected hardware platforms.
Applying virtualization to the embedded domain brings a smaller form factor and a reduced bill of
materials (BOM). All of these advantages minimize overall costs and consequently improve profit
margins [PTM16a]. Despite the differences among several embedded industries, all share an
upward trend for integration, due to the common interest in building systems with reduced size,
weight, power and cost (SWAP-C) budget [BBO+16, PPG+17].
According to the virtualization taxonomy [SGB+16], virtualization techniques can be classified
mainly into two types: full-virtualization and paravirtualization. Full-virtualization is a virtualization
technique in which the hypervisor presents to guest OSes an exact replica of the underlying
hardware. Guest OSes do not require any modification to their kernel code, and are completely
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unaware of the system’s virtualization. Privileged instructions trap to the hypervisor and are em-
ulated on behalf of the guest OS. This trap-and-emulate procedure has been, for a long time,
supported by dynamic binary translation (DBT) techniques, which result in large overheads, com-
promising either the real-time capability of embedded devices or their security [CSA+16]. This
drawbacks led the processor industry’s Big Players to extend their ISAs to support hardware-
assisted full-virtualization. The advent of hardware virtualization extensions (e.g., Arm Virtualiza-
tion Extensions, Intel Virtualization Technology) has resulted in new virtualization solutions capable
of providing efficient hypervisors and real-time guarantees [DN14, ZMH15]. Para-virtualization, in
contrast, requires modification of the guest OSes. The privileged instructions are replaced by spe-
cific hypervisor calls (hypercalls), to request services directly from the hypervisor. The guestOSes
communicate directly with the hypervisor, instead of implicitly and unknowingly invoking the hy-
pervisor through virtual resource access, resulting in significant performance advantages at the
cost of a considerably higher engineering effort.
Arm TrustZone technology, although implemented for security purposes, has enabled a spe-
cialized, hardware-assisted form of system virtualization [FLWH10]. With virtual hardware support
for dual world execution, an extra processor mode (i.e., the monitor mode), and other TrustZone
features like memory segmentation, it is possible to provide time and spatial isolation between
execution environments. Basically, the non-secure software runs inside a VM whose resources
are completely managed and controlled by a hypervisor running in the secure world. TrustZone-
assisted virtualization is not particularly considered full-virtualization neither paravirtualization,
because, although guestOSes can run without modifications on the non-secure world side, they
need to co-operate regarding the memory map and address space they are using. There are sev-
eral open-source TrustZone-based solutions for virtualization, such as SafeG [SHT10] and LTZVisor
[PPG+17].
Reconfigurable platforms, hybrid platforms, programmable systems-on-a-chips SoCs, or Field
programmable SoCs (FPSoC) are different designations describing the same concept: technolo-
gies for the implementation of digital systems combining software components with hardware
accelerators [PRAM17]. The Xilinx Zynq-7000 SoC family integrates the software programmabil-
ity of an ARM-based processor with the hardware programmability of an field programmable gate
array (FPGA), enabling hardware acceleration while integrating central processing unit (CPU),
digital signal processor (DSP), and mixed signal functionality on a single device. Programmable
SoCs are becoming leading players in the embedded systems space, because the combination
of a plethora of hard-wired resources with configurable logic enables the efficient implementation
of systems that perfectly fit the heterogeneous nature of embedded applications [PRAM17].
Reconfigurable hardware promises to help mitigating the rigid constraints (e.g., real-time,
performance, power consumption, safety, and security) typical of the embedded domain. The ap-
plicability of such technology ranges from offloading specific applications to hardware [PRAM17,
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CI18], to offloading real-time operating system (RTOS) services [GGP+16] or even hypervisor
features [XPN15] to enable guest to access the reconfigurable logic. RT-SHADOWS [GGP+16]
and ReconOS [LP09] are just a few examples of operating systems which take advantage of re-
configurable hardware technology to improve system performance, determinism and real-time.
Mini-Nova [XPN15] exploits the potential of CPU-FPGA systems by proposing a virtualization frame-
work taking advantage of both virtualization and dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) techniques.
The innovative open-source Xilinx Python-based framework [CI18, G. 18] provides an infrastruc-
ture that binds Programmable SoC hardware to the Python environment simplifying the addition
of ad-hoc hardware modules in the programmable logic.
In addition to the bound that most embedded systems have with real-time constraints, embed-
ded applications also require general-purpose systems to handle operator interfaces, databases,
and general-purpose computing tasks. Due to the heavy and complex nature of these systems, a
good solution to improve the performance of these systems is to use multicore technology.
This project presents a hardware-software co-design framework which explores several ca-
pabilities of Zynq-based platforms for easing the economy of building the new generation of em-
bedded systems devices. To the best of our knowledge, no existing framework targeting the
Zynq SoC is able to fully and simultaneously explore TrustZone, multiprocessing, as well as an
hardware-accelerated RTOS via reconfigurable logic. Arm TrustZone technology is exploited to
implement the root of trust of a virtualization-based architecture that allows the execution of a
General Purpose Operating System (GPOS) side-by-side with a real-Time OS. RTOS services were
offloaded to the FPGA fabric, so that we can present simultaneous improvements on performance
and determinism. Instead of focusing in a concrete application, we provide a complete frame-
work, specifically tailored for Zynq-base devices, that developers can use to accelerate a bunch
of distinct applications across different embedded industries.
1.1 Goals
The main goal of this thesis goes towards the implementation of a hardware-software co-
designed virtualization framework. The cornerstone of this virtualization framework development
is the in-house hypervisor LTZVisor, given that a from-scratch design and implementation would be
overkill. LTZVisor [PPG+17] is an open-source lightweight TrustZone-assisted hypervisor mainly
targeting the consolidation of mixed-criticallity systems. LTZVisor provides a virtualization solution
based on the two virtual execution environments provided by the TrustZone hardware, in which
implements a dual-guest OS configuration: the secure world hosts the RTOS and the hypervisor
while the non-secure world is assigned to the GPOS. Notwithstanding, it is believed that the explo-
ration of reconfigurable computing can bring several benefits and present a promising approach.
In this sense, this thesis aims at accomplish the following goals:
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1. Enhance the perfomance and multimedia capability of the non-secure OS, by setting up
the multicore configuration and configuring audio/video interface. These goals can be
splitted in two parts:
(a) Enrich the multimedia capabilities of the general-purpose OS guest by incorporating
a high-definition multimedia interface (HDMI) transmitter driver. This will allow the
system to handle operator interfaces and other multimedia services.
(b) Enable the multi-processing configuration so that the GPOS runs on a dual-core
platform. This will impose changes on the hypervisor, since the LTZVisor as it stands,
only allows the execution of single-core VMs.
2. In behalf of ensuring the hard real-time requirement of critical software some RTOS services
of the secure guest will be deployed to the reconfigurable hardware. This overall goal can
be into more fine-grained objectives:
(a) Perform a comprehensive survey on FreeRTOS, an open source RTOS kernel, identi-
fying which process are a major source of overhead for the Trusted computing base
(TCB) and/or impose latency and indeterminism;
(b) Deployment of the processes that were classified has major sources of jitter and
overhead to the programmable logic. Consequently, give these offloaded services
the same level of security of the associated guest.
3. Integrate the operating systems designed in the base hypervisor, LTZVisor. Assigning the
respective privilege level to them and all their components. Taking into account the nec-
essary changes to the current scheme of the LTZVisor in order to integrate the multicore
general-purpose guest and the hardware-software co-design real-time system;
4. Evaluate the hypervisor’s implemented artifacts, namely in terms of performance and
security;
5. Evaluate the conceived work regarding the hypervisor and its guests, namely identifying
the gains of the used approach as well as the counter-parts.
1.2 Document Structure
The present thesis is divided into 6 different chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, described
the contextualization for the problem addressed, the motivations for its implementation. Chapter
2 overviews the basic concepts and background knowledge to understand the developed work.
It covers the technologies used during the development of the thesis, with emphasis on virtual-
ization, multicore and reconfigurable hardware technologies. Chapter 3 describes the tools and
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platform. It starts by overviewing LTZVisor, and then focus on describing FreeRTOS. In addition,
the architecture of , since the hardware-software real-time VM implementation will be based on
this operating system. Chapter 4 addresses the design and implementation of Trust SecSi CoDe
framework. It starts by describing the goals for the framework, specifying the enhancements to
the current LTZVisor architecture. Then it addresses the implementation of the hardware-assisted
RTOS as well as the modifications needed to support the multimedia GPOS. Additionally a de-
scription of the necessary modifications on the hypervisor in order to host the hardware-assisted
secure VM and the multicore non-secure VM. Chapter 5 presents the evaluation, focusing on
memory footprint, performance, and real-time. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of this
thesis and draws conclusions regarding open issues of Trust SecSi CoDe, outlining a roadmap
for future improvements and research.

2. Background, Context and State of the
Art
The chapter 2 intent to provide the necessary fundamental concepts and related work to
understand and contextualize the developed project. First, it overviews and compares general-
purpose operating systems and real-time systems. Second, it focus on explaining and describing
virtualization. Then it provides a description of the TrustZone, field-programmable gate array
(FPGA) and multiprocessing, focusing on how these technologies are exploited to implement the
root-of-trust of a virtualization-based architecture. Lastly, it presents the state of art in mixed
criticality and hybrid hardware-software systems.
2.1 Operating Systems
Operating system (OS) is the software component responsible for the management and co-
ordination of activities, as well as the sharing of the system resources. Operating systems tend to
alleviate the complexity of embedded systems development by providing several different mech-
anisms, such as multithreading, semaphores, timers and interrupt handling, in order to abstract
and coordinate the overall system behaviour.
Embedded systems often have the need for deterministic response to real-time events. To
support the requirement for determinism, embedded applications typically use real-time operating
systems (RTOSs). Embedded applications also employ general-purpose OSes to handle opera-
tor interfaces, databases, and general-purpose computing tasks. System architectures that can
combine both types of processing on the same platform can save costs by eliminating redundant
hardware.
2.1.1 General-purpose Operating Systems
A general-purpose operating system (GPOS) is a fully-featured operating system intended to
provide a good user experience. These OSs are designed to optimize average performance of
application programs at the expense of predictability. GPOSs typically provide a non-deterministic
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response, where there are no guarantees as to when each task will complete, but they will try to
stay responsive to the user.
In applications that have several distinguish purposes and do not impose time critical, general-
purpose operating systems are the most suitable OS, due to GPOSs commonly uses a fairness
policy to dispatch threads and processes. Such policy enables the high overall throughput required
by user interface and server applications, but offers no guarantees that high-priority, time critical
threads will execute in preference to lower-priority threads. Examples of GPOSs include the well-
known Windows, Linux and MacOS.
A good example of an operating system used in the embedded systems world is Embedded
Linux OS. Its application is usually motivated by the availability of device support, file-systems,
network connectivity, and UI support [OK13b] besides being open-source and free to use. These
features can be available in a RTOS, but often with less broad support, or at additional cost or
integration effort.
2.1.2 Real-time Operating Systems
Most embedded systems are bound to real-time constraints [SR04]. Real-time constraint
means that the system behaviour depends not only on the logical results of the computation,
but also on the physical instant at which these results are produced. Basically, in strict real-time
systems a late result is not just late but wrong. An operating system which is capable of taking
care of real-time constraints is called a real-time operating system (RTOS).
The real-time strictness depends on the purpose of the application and it can be hard real-
time or soft real-time [OK13a]. In hard real-time systems, tasks have to be performed not only
correctly but on time and a failure to meet a deadline is considered to be a fatal fault and lead
to disastrous consequences. In a soft real-time system, tasks are performed by the system as
fast as possible, and if possible, in its specific time. A deadline miss on a soft real-time system
is undesirable but will not cause a serious harm, however could lead an array of deadline misses
until failure. Most real time systems have a combination of soft and hard requirements. Real-time
software applications are typically more difficult to design than non-real-time applications.
Following, some important real-time operating system concepts:
• Shared resource is any entity used by a task that can be used by other tasks. Each task
should gain exclusive access to the shared resource to prevent data corruption. The code
that needs to be treated indivisibly is called critical section of code. To ensure this section of
code is not interrupted, interrupts are typically disabled before the critical code is executed
and enabled when the critical code is finished.
• The process of scheduling and switching the CPU between several tasks is called multi-
tasking. Multitasking maximizes the utilization of the CPU and also provides for modular
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construction of applications. One of the most important aspects of multitasking is that
it allows the application programmer to manage complexity inherent to real-time applica-
tions. Application programs are typically easier to design and maintain if multitasking is
used.
• The design process for a real-time application involves splitting the work to be done into
tasks which are responsible for a portion of the problem. Each task is assigned a priority, its
own set of CPU registers, and its own stack area. Each task typically is an infinite loop that
can be in any one of five states: SUSPEND, READY, RUNNING, WAITING, or INTERRUPTED.
The SUSPEND state corresponds to a task which resides in memory but has not beenmade
available to the multitasking kernel. A task is READY when it can execute but its priority
is less than the currently running task. When the tasks is in RUNNING state it has control
of the CPU. A task is WAITING when it requires the occurrence of an event (waiting for a
time to expire, an I/O operation to complete, a shared resource to be available, a timing
pulse to occur, etc.). Finally, a task is INTERRUPTED when an interrupt has occurred and
the CPU is in the process of servicing the interrupt.
• The process of saving the current task’s context and restore the new task’s context from
its storage area and then resume execution of the new task’s code, is called context switch
or a task switch. Context switching adds overhead to the application. The more registers
a CPU has, the higher the overhead. The time required to perform a context switch is
determined by how many registers have to be saved and restored by the CPU.
• The kernel is the part of a multitasking system responsible for the management of tasks
and the communication between tasks. The fundamental service provided by the kernel
is context switching. The use of a real-time kernel will generally simplify the design of
systems by allowing the application to be divided into multiple tasks managed by the kernel.
However, the kernel add overhead to the system because it requires extra memory for the
kernel data structures but most importantly, each task requires its own stack space which
has a tendency to require large amount of RAM RAM quite quickly.
The basic services required in a RTOS kernel are illustrated in the Figure 2.1. Task Manage-
ment is shown at the center of the RTOS kernel. The RTOS’s task management is responsible for
task scheduling and provide a set of services that handle the tasks behaviour. The scheduler is
the part of the kernel responsible for determining which task will run next. Most real-time kernels
are priority based. Each task is assigned a priority based on its importance. The priority for each
task is application specific. In a priority-based kernel, control of the CPU will always be given to
the highest priority task ready-to-run.
The second main section of an RTOS kernel is inter-task communication and synchroniza-
tion, know as inter-process communication (IPC). Without IPC and synchronization mechanisms
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Figure 2.1: RTOS Kernel
tasks could communicate corrupted information or otherwise interfere with one another. Most
RTOS kernels offer a variety of inter-task communication and synchronization mechanisms that
may include message queues, pipes, semaphores, mailboxes, event groups and asynchronous
signals. The dynamic memory allocation section in RTOS typically uses pools memory allocation
mechanism.
RTOS emphasize predictability, efficiency, and include features to support timing constraints.
In contrast to GPOS, this type of OS attempt to minimize latency rather than maximize throughput.
To reduce the run-time overheads, the kernel has to have quick response to external interrupts and
context switches between tasks, as well as small size. In order to meet the timing requirements,
the kernel must support multi-tasking, provide priority-based preemptive scheduling and synchro-
nization mechanisms. Such rigid constraints and requirements can be more easily achieved by
using hardware-software co-design architectures.
2.1.3 Hardware-Software Real-Time Operating Systems
Hardware-software co-design is the concurrent design of both hardware and software of the
system by taking into consideration the cost, energy, performance, speed and other parameters
of the system. Hardware-software OSes are systems that has some of the services implemented
in hardware and such services can be specific application tasks or even kernel functionalities.
The presence of an operating system introduces new sources of latency and lack of determin-
ism [SWP04]. Lack of determinism is caused by response time variation (jitter), another of the
least desired characteristics of a RTOS. Most of jitter sources comes from RTOS’ dynamic data
structures and their management and traversal. Migration to hardware of software tasks and
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services, addresses the jitter issues leading to solutions able to cope with these increasingly strict
requirements. Migration of RTOS services, such as scheduling, task management and synchro-
nization services, to dedicated hardware modules, allows the RTOS to meet metrics requirements
and consequently, provides increased system performance.
There is a large number of projects/publications focusing on attempt to make an embedded
system capable of providing hardware support to a RTOS, typically following a component based
model [vOvdLKM00, LMP+05]. Back in 1991, efforts were being made to integrate operating
systems’ functionalities in hardware, providing microprocessors with the ability to offer support to
the RTOSs’ primitives [Lin91]. The emergence of high capacity reconfigurable FPGAs at a lower
cost, renewed the interest in this field in recent years [SOLMTS04, PS12]. Nevertheless, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no work that has linking hardware-software co-design OS with
virtualization technologies.
The Hybrid Real-Time Operating System [GPG+15], for example, is a hardware-software co-
designed RTOS that takes advantage of hardware accelerators to improve the RTOS performance
and determinism. HcM-FreeRTOS [QLG+15] makes use of the ARM Generic Interrupt Controller
(GIC) to offload FreeRTOS kernel components to a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) multicore hard-
ware. RT-SHADOWS [GGP+16] and HartOS [LASS12] are more examples of operating systems
which take advantage of reconfigurable hardware technology to improve system performance,
determinism and real-time guarantees.
2.1.3.1 Hthreads
The Hthreads operating system consists of a multitasking RTOS kernel that integrates a hybrid
task programming model developed for hybrid systems. This hybrid task programming model is
intended to provide a high level programming environment where programmers are able to access
the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) resources through the use of a software programming
model [APA+05].
This operating system supports up to 256 software tasks, 256 hardware tasks, 64 blocking
semaphores, 64 binary semaphores, preemptive priorities, round robin and First In First Out
(FIFO) scheduling algorithms, 256 tasks are allowed to run simultaneously with 128 priority levels
and use up to 64 traffic lights. Functionalities of the operating system, such as task manager,
scheduler, semaphores, and interrupt controller are mapped to hardware, resulting in shorter
interrupt latencies, fewer CPU context shifts, and reduced jitter.
2.1.3.2 ReconOS
In the ReconOS operating system, the programming model and system architecture provides
unified operating system services for software and hardware execution functions and a standard-
ized interface for integrating custom hardware accelerators. This OS was based on the eCos OS
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[SOSA08].
ECos is an open-source RTOS intended for embedded applications, it is highly configurable
which enables this operating system to be adapted to the requirements of the applications, offering
the best possible run-time performance and an optimized footprint for the hardware resources
[SOSA08].
In ReconOS, all hardware tasks have access to all relevant operating system services offered
by eCos in a transparent way. For example, the tasks they communicate do not need to know
if their communication partners are running as hardware tasks or software [SOSA08], and this
system can simultaneously perform software and hardware tasks. The existing operating sys-
tem layer provides a symmetry between software and hardware tasks that offers benefits for
reconfigurable hardware systems, that can initially develop the entire system using software im-
plementation and later the parts of the application with critical performance can be migrated for
one-to-one hardware tasks. The software tasks have a sequential execution and to use operating
system services the task simply calls the corresponding function of the operating system library
but the hardware tasks present another paradigm because they have a parallel execution, which
means that there is no controlled flow and no apparent notion of calling a function from the op-
erating system. In order to present itself as a possible unified programming model for the user,
the approach of structuring a hardware segment was followed so that all interactions with the op-
erating system were managed by a sequential state machine, in two processes: synchronization
state machine and user logic.
2.2 Virtualization
Virtualization refers to the creation of an integral or partial abstraction in software of the
physical hardware by providing an environment that abstract the underlying hardware platform
and enables the safe sharing of available resources. Thereby, the software executed on these
virtual machines is separated from the underlying hardware resources. Consequently, the system
is transformed so that it appears as an emulated, different machine, or even a set of multiple
machines, as much as possible a replicate of the original one.
Virtualization is a widely used because encompasses a wide range of technologies and can
mean very different things in different contexts. In this context, virtualization refers to the technol-
ogy that allows the co-existence of multiple operating systems (OSes) environments on a single
physical platform. This method introduce an additional software layer to provide this abstraction,
often called Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) or hypervisor [AH10, SGB+16, Kai09, GZ12]. To guar-
anteed isolation, the hypervisor usually runs with full privileges while the virtual machines (VMs),
also called guests, are pushed to lower privilege layers. Therefore, the hypervisor has full control
of the underlying hardware platform. Usually the full privilege mode of the system is associated to
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the exclusive control of certain peripherals that are used to apply temporal and spatial isolation,
such as timers and memory controllers. The exclusive assignment of the hypervisor privilege
mode is considered to be one of the major challenges in implementing virtualization techniques
on embedded systems.
Besides the benefit of providing multiple concurrent VM environments while multiplexing the
underlying resources, virtualization brings benefit of isolation and encapsulation. Consequently,
improve system’s safety and security, two key requirements of current embedded applications.
Virtualization technology also deliver application consolidation benefits, which helps in reducing
production costs by lowering the amount of required hardware to support all the desired function-
ality, and to reduce energy consumption by load-balancing across clusters [AH10, Hei08, AG09].
The hypervisor should be responsible for the scheduling management of the operating sys-
tems guests„ likewise an OS should also perform the context switch and the changes necessary
to scheduling possibility. According to the methodology of how they are implemented, hypervisors
can be classified by two types, as shown in the Figure 2.2.
• Type 1 hypervisors execute directly above the hardware; Hypervisors, or bare-metal Hy-
pervisors, have direct access to the hardware layer and manage the execution permissions
of every system component, which means that all the hardware accesses are to be me-
diated and controlled by the VMM. As a consequence of this being the most privileged
software on the running platform, the performance degradation of guests OSes will only
be influenced by the performance of the Hypervisor itself, making this type of VM more
suited to systems that must meet time constraints.
• Type 2 hypervisors run on top of an OS [AH10, SGB+16, GZ12], and are also called
hosted hypervisors. This type of VMM usually does not have permissions to access and
perform any operation on the hardware directly since those responsibilities usually rest in
the system software that runs below the VMM, which usually results in lower performance
ratings compared to the type-1 hypervisors.
Regardless of their type, there are mainly two different approaches towards a virtualization
solution: Full Virtualization and Para-Virtualization. Full virtualization schemes simulate the hard-
ware environment. Therefore, VMs do not need modifications to execute. In contrast, para-
virtualization demand certain changes at the OS level in order to execute in the virtual machine, re-
placing critical instructions with system calls to the hypervisor (hypercalls). There are benefits and
disadvantages in each approach. A full-virtualization configuration require little engineering effort
for VM’s deployment, this is more suitable for the deployment of single binaries, when using pro-
prietary OSes for which the source code is not available. Notwithstanding, classic full-virtualization
shows poor performance and high complexity due to the high-frequency mode courses, need for
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Figure 2.2: Hypervisor Types
software to impersonate hardware in trap-and-emulate and DBT. Para-virtualized solutions usu-
ally incur better performance, as the performed changes may also aim to remove unnecessary
operations; however, it typically has associated a higher. involve a higher engineering effort of
manually modify each guest source-code. Besides, the lack of a standardized VMM interface for
VMs, the need to keep up with OS versions and, of course, the obligation for the availability of OS
source code [PKR+13, SK10].
2.2.1 Hardware-assisted Virtualization
Due to the gradual growth of its popularity even with the known ones disadvantages adjacent
to software-assisted virtualization solutions, the development and use of hardware-assisted vir-
tualization techniques gained a new focus. These techniques make use of integrated hardware
extensions in the processor architectures itself to implement virtualization solutions without all or
part of the software-assisted disadvantages.
Extensions are usually characterized by adding to the processor a new level of privilege,which
has higher privilege of execution than the kernel and user modes. Depending on the extension
itself, these primitives may include additions or changes to the components of the primitive pro-
cessor to produce a authentic virtual CPUs in hardware. In between platform peripherals, general
purpose registers or coprocessors, MMUs, caches, and the memory or memory controller itself.
Within the hardware extensions for using virtualization in the domain embedded systems
include the ARM Virtualization Extensions (ARM VE) and Intel Virtualization Technology (Intel VT)
[DN14, ZMH15].
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2.3 ARM TrustZone
Arm TrustZone consists of hardware security extensions introduced into Arm application pro-
cessors (Cortex-A) in 2004 [ARM09]. More recently, TrustZone has been adapted to cover the new
generation of Arm microcontrollers (Cortex-M) [PS]. TrustZone follows a system-wide approach
to security. In the remainder of this section, when describing TrustZone, the focus will be on the
specificities of this technology for Cortex-A processors.
The Arm TrustZone technology is centered around the concept of protection domains named
secure world and non-secure world. The software executed by the processor runs either in the
secure world or in the non-secure world. A new 33rd processor bit, the Non-Secure (NS) bit,
indicates in which world the processor is currently executing. To preserve the processor state
during the world switch, TrustZone adds an extra processor mode: monitor mode. This mode
is completely different from other modes because, when the processor runs in this privileged
mode, the state is always considered secure, independently of the NS bit’s state. Software stacks
in the two worlds can be bridged via a new privileged instruction-Secure Monitor Call (SMC). The
monitor mode can also be entered by configuring it to handle interrupts and exceptions in the
secure side. To ensure a strong isolation between secure and non-secure states, some special
registers are banked, while others are either totally unavailable for the non-secure side.
The TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC) and the TrustZone Memory Adapter (TZMA)
extend TrustZone security to thememory infrastructure. TZASC can partition the dynamic random-
access memory (DRAM) into different secure and non-secure memory regions, by using a pro-
gramming interface which is only accessible from the secure side. By design, secure world
applications can access normal world memory, but the reverse is not possible. TZMA provides
similar functionality but for off-chip read-only memory (ROM) or static random-access memory
(SRAMs). Both the TZASC and TZMA are optional and implementation-specific components on
the TrustZone specification. In addition, the granularity of memory regions depends on the sys-
tem on chip (SoC). In Zynq-7000 devices, the memory subsystem includes the TZASC, which
allows the (dynamic) configuration of the security state of memory segments with a granularity
of 64 MB [Xil14]. The TrustZone-aware memory management unit (MMU) provides two distinct
MMU interfaces, enabling each world to have a local set of virtual-to-physical memory address
translation tables. Furthermore, three different exception vectors exist: the secure-world vector,
the non-secure world vector and the monitor vector. The isolation is still available at the cache-
level because processor’s caches have been extended with an additional tag that signals in which
state the processor accessed the memory.
System devices can be dynamically configured as secure or non-secure through the TrustZone
Protection Controller (TZPC). The TZPC is also an optional and implementation-specific compo-
nent on the TrustZone specification. In Zynq-7000 devices, it is possible to (dynamically) configure
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the security state of several SoC (e.g., Triple Timer Counter, Ethernet controller) devices, as well
as access to FPGA AXI ports as secure or non-secure [Xil14]. To support the robust management
of secure and non-secure interrupts, the Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) provides both secure
and non-secure prioritized interrupt sources. The interrupt controller supports interrupt prioriti-
zation, allowing the configuration of secure interrupts with a higher priority than the non-secure
interrupts. Such configurability prevents non-secure software from performing a denial-of-service
(DOS) attack against the secure side.
2.4 FPGA Technology
Application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) are non-programmable but highly integrated,
small, fast, and energy efficient. Also, ASICs make the process of copy/reverse engineering more
difficult for both hardware and software perspective. In contrast, due the non-programmability
nature, these chips need to be redesigned and refactoring all over again if modifications have to
be made.
Field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology consists of logic and interconnect resources
that permit to configure an uncommitted chip into the desired functions for different applica-
tions. These chips can be configured to implement custom hardware functionalities without going
through the long fabrication process of custom ASIC design. FPGA technology continues to gain
momentum since their invention by Xilinx in 1984. FPGA chip adoption across all industries is
driven by the fact that FPGAs combine the best parts of ASICs and processor-based systems.
FPGAs provide hardware-timed speed and reliability, but they do not require high volumes to
justify the large upfront expense of custom ASIC design. Reprogrammable platforms also has
the same flexibility of software running on a processor-based system, but it is not limited by the
number of processing cores available. Unlike processors, FPGAs are truly parallel in nature, so
different processing operations do not have to compete for the same resources. Each independent
processing task is assigned to a dedicated section of the chip, and can execute autonomously
without any influence from other logic blocks. As a result, the performance of one part of the
application is not affected when you add more processing.
Taking advantage of hardware parallelism, FPGAs exceed the computing power of digital
signal processors (DSPs) by breaking the paradigm of sequential execution and accomplishing
more per clock cycle. Controlling inputs and outputs (I/O) at the hardware level provides faster
response times and specialized functionality to closely match application requirements. FPGA
technology offers flexibility and rapid prototyping capabilities in the face of increased time-to-
market concerns. The growing availability of high-level software tools decreases the learning curve
with layers of abstraction and often offers valuable IP cores (pre-built functions) for advanced
control and signal processing. Because system requirements often change over time, the cost of
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making incremental changes to FPGA designs is negligible when compared to the large expense
of refactoring an ASIC.
2.4.1 Hardware Description Languages
For a long time, programming languages such as FORTRAN, Pascal, and C were being used
to describe computer programs that were sequential in nature. Similarly, in the digital design
field, designers felt the need for a standard language to describe digital circuits. Thus, Hardware
Description Languages (HDLs) came into existence [Pal03]. HDLs allowed the designers to model
the concurrency of processes found in hardware elements. Both Verilog and VHDL simulators to
simulate large digital circuits quickly gained acceptance from designers.
Designers no longer had to manually place gates to build digital circuits. They could describe
complex circuits at an abstract level in terms of functionality and data flow by designing those
circuits in HDLs. Logic synthesis tools would implement the specified functionality in terms of
gates and gate interconnections. HDLs are used for simulation of system boards, interconnect
buses, FPGAs, and Programmable Array Logic (PALs). A common approach is to design each IC
chip, using an HDL, and then verify system functionality via simulation
2.5 Multicore Processor Technology
With the increasing demand for computing power, greater levels of security and higher per-
formances, more control applications will be used which can require more complex design and
implementation techniques. The need of higher computing power is being covered by the adop-
tion of multi-core architectures. The multicore processor comprises of two or more cores or
computational/processing units that operate in parallel to read and execute instructions. The key
factor about multicore processor is that it gives the same performance of a single faster processor
at lower power dissipation and at a lower clock frequency by handling more tasks or instructions
in parallel. The performance of a processor is a function of three major factors:
• Instructions per cycle, can be improved by increasing instructions level parallelism and
thread level parallelism.
• Clock cycles per instruction, can be increased by the techniques of pipelining.
• Clock frequency, if increased, the power dissipation increases, in turn cause overheating.
Therefore, at a lower clock frequency, the multicore processor will process more data than
the single core processor. In addition to this, multicore processors deliver high performance and
handle complex tasks at a comparatively lower power as compared with a single core.
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The cores normally are independent of one another, except for resources such as main RAM
and some peripherals I/O. There is also a cache level (typically L2) that is shared between the
cores, however the most important caches (L1) are particular to each core. In these cache level
a coherence problem can occur: caches on different cores may contain different values from the
same address in the main memory. To resolve this kind of situation, it could use software-assisted
solutions responsible for maintaining consistency across the cores of each core, or hardware
solutions for example the Snoop Control Unit (SCU) in ARM processors.
A multicore architecture where every core is just an image of the other is called homogeneous
multicore. A heterogeneous multicore is a set of cores which may differ in area, perfomance,
power dissipated etc. There are a number of challenges involved in designing a high-perfomance
multicore system: parallel processing and shared resources are some of the difficulties on migra-
tion of single-core applications. The problems are mitigated by using syncronisation and commu-
nications services.
There are different types of multicore configuration. The most used approaches encompass
the Symmetric Multiprocessing (SMP) configuration and Asymetric Multiprocessing (AMP) config-
uration.
2.5.1 Symetric Multiprocessing
The symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) configuration is only seen on homogeneous platforms
and there is only one operating system that commands the platform cores belonging to the SMP
configuration.
Any application, process or task, which does not have affinity to one of the cores, can be
executed in any core, and is the scheduler’s job migrate those same tasks to different cores.
Moreover, the idea is to achieve an favourable workload across all cores, through the migration
of different tasks. However, this migration should not be too frequent since the change of tasks
between cores may affect cache performance.
This multicore configuration presents the smallest memory footprint because the different
cores run the same image of the operating system. All cores have the same view of memory
and shared hardware. Usually one of the cores will be attributed the responsibility to boot the
operating system as well as to ensure the startup of the remaining cores and will also eventually
’command’ access to shared I/O peripherals.
In a single-core operating system it is necessary to use synchronism mechanisms for the
correct operation of the tasks that share the same resources, since they execute in parallel, i.e.
they can be schedule at intervals. In a multicore SMP operating system the situation is aggra-
vated by the fact that the execution is truly parallel, and it is necessary to implement multicore
synchronism mechanisms (eg spinlock) in order to avoid problems of competition of tasks. In this
configuration where the cores have access to the same memory (i.e., the main memory will be
Chapter 2. Background, Context and State of the Art 19
a shared between the colors) it is necessary to use its own hardware to maintain the coherence
between the data in cache and memory main.
2.5.2 Asymetric Multiprocessing
The asymetric multiprocessing (AMP) configuration is defined by treating each core individ-
ually, i.e., each core executes independently of the other cores, running in each its individual
version of an OS. The AMP configuration can be considered homogeneous if each one runs an
individual copy of the same operating system or heterogeneous if each core has an OS different
from the one executed in the other cores. This configuration is characterized by the increase
memory footprint, because each core will have a copy of its own version of the operating system
that it runs. However, they do not require data coherence mechanisms, since each core would
have its own memory, cache and MMU. Each core can have a different view of available memory
and shared hardware.
From the point of view of each core, it runs as if it were in a single-core configuration. In that
case, due to the nature of the configuration (each core has its OS), no core knows the existence
of others (except the synchronization and communication mechanisms). This particularity allows
to have a execution environment identical to that of a single-core configuration, thus facilitating
the migration of legacy applications.
2.6 Mixed Criticality Systems
An increasingly important trend in the design of real-time and embedded systems is the inte-
gration of components with different levels of criticality onto a common hardware platform. For
example, embedded systems have a need for a deterministic response to real-time events and
there is also an interest in using general-purpose OSs to handle operator interfaces, databases,
and general-purpose computing tasks. Systems that can combine both criticality leves of pro-
cessing on the same platform can save costs by eliminating redundant computing hardware.
Mixed-criticality systems (MCS) integrate two or more distinct levels (for example safety critical,
mission-critical and low-critical) in one system. The following sections give a glance in some
hypervisors that deal with guests of different criticality levels.
2.6.1 SafeG
Safety Gate (SafeG) [SHT10], from TOPPERS Project, is a dual-OS open-source solution that
takes advantage of ARM TrustZone extensions to concurrently execute an RTOS and a GPOS on
the same hardware platform.
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The VMM execute in secure monitor mode and handle the switching between the GPOS,
executed in non-secure, and the RTOS, executed in secure. Spatial isolation is supported by
configuring resources (memory and devices) used by the RTOS to be accessible only from secure.
The remaining resources are configured to be accessible both from secure and non-secure. This
configuration is performed at initialization time after SafeG is loaded. If the GPOS tries to access
some resource configured as secure space, an exception occurs and SafeG is called. Time
isolation of the RTOS is supported by carefully using the two types of interrupt. FIQ interrupts
are forwarded to the RTOS, while IRQ interrupts are forwarded to the GPOS. In secure state, IRQs
are disabled so that the GPOS cannot interrupt the execution of the RTOS. For that reason, the
GPOS can only execute once the RTOS makes an explicit request, through a Secure Monitor Call
(SMC), to SafeG. On the other hand, during the GPOS execution, FIQs are enabled so that the
RTOS can recover the control of the processor. TrustZone is configured to prevent the non-secure
side from disabling FIQ interrupts.
2.6.2 NOVA/MINI-NOVA
The NOVA microhypervisor [SK10][KHV14] , originally developed for the x86 desktop environ-
ment and relying on Intel’s virtualization hardware. NOVA proposes a security-oriented solution
that deallocates virtualization to user space enforcing the principle of the least privilege in mi-
crokernel style. A user-level environment contains the root partition manager, device drivers,
and other special-purpose applications and services that have been written for or ported to the
hypercall interface. This interface implements capability-based access to kernel objects.
The Mini-NOVA[XPN15] microkernel, which is designed to provide a virtualization approach
for the ARM-FPGA platform. Mini-NOVA is built to host paravirtualized operating systems with
lower complexity and has the ability to dispatch hardware tasks to virtual machines by supporting
the dynamic partial reconfiguration technology.
The Mini-NOVA kernel is an abstract layer between the physical resources and software users.
For each guest OS/application, a virtual machine is initiated, running in an isolated user domain.
A virtual machine monitor is used to create the virtualized environment for VMs. Based on the
microkernel features[Lie95], the VMM should provide VMs with four basic properties: CPU virtu-
alization, memory management, communication, and scheduling. To minimize the TCB size of
the privileged code. The Mini-Nova architeture is illustrated in Fig. 2.3
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Figure 1. Mini-NOVA Architecture Overview
III. MINI-NOVA VIRTUALIZATION ON CORTEX-A9
In this section, we introduce the implementation of
Mini-NOVA virtualization on ARM platform. Mini-NOVA
is a revised and simplified version of the NOVA micro-
hypervisor (x86), and has been ported on the ARM Cortex-
A9 architecture, which is the latest ARM version available
for contemporary ARM-FPGA platforms. The principle of
Mini-NOVA is to reduce complexity to reach lower over-
head, smaller TCB size and higher security, making it more
flexible and portable for embedded devices. Due to the
absence of hardware virtualization support in the Cortex-A9
architecture, paravirtualization is used in Mini-NOVA.
The Cortex-A9 architecture offers 6 main operating
modes, which are divided into two privilege levels: non-
privileged PL0 (USR mode) and privileged PL1 (SVC, IRQ,
FIQ, UND and ABT modes). Mini-NOVA is mainly execut-
ing in the supervisor (SVC) mode, occupying the privileged
level, while guest OS(es) are running in the user (USR) mod-
e. Other modes are mainly used to respectively trap different
types of exceptions: interrupt, Undefined Instruction (UND)
and Prefetch/Data Abort (ABT). These exception types are
used to build the virtualized environment. Interrupts are
trapped into the IRQ and fast IRQ modes (IRQ/FIQ). UND
exceptions are mostly caused by unpermitted instructions on
the system registers or coprocessors. They are usually used
to trap privilege instructions. ABT exceptions are caused by
illegal memory access attempts, such as page faults, and
are used for the virtualized memory space management.
Whenever an exception occurs, the CPU leaves the user
mode and enters the corresponding exception mode, which
would later give control back to the SVC mode to handle
this exception.
The Mini-NOVA kernel is an abstract layer between
the physical resources and software users. For each guest
OS/Application, a virtual machine is initiated, running in
an isolated user domain. A virtual machine monitor is
used to create the virtualized environment for VMs. Based
on the microkernel features [4], the VMM should provide
VMs with four basic properties: CPU virtualization, memory
TABLE I. VIRTUAL CPU CONTENT IN MINI-NOVA
Privilege
level
Resources
Switch
mechanism
Non-
privileged
General-Purpose Registers
Platform-specific timer
Active switch
Vector Floating-Point (VFP) Lazy switch
Privileged
Coprocessor Registers(CP14/CP15)
Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC)
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
Active switch
Vector Floating-Point (VFP)
L2 Cache Control Registers
Lazy switch
management, communication, and scheduling. To minimize
the TCB size of the privileged code, we decompose the
microkernel and implemented parts of its properties at user
level. The overview of Mini-NOVA is illustrated in Fig. 1.
A. CPU virtualization
For each virtual machine, Mini-NOVA instantiates a spe-
cific data structure that holds in kernel memory the states of
hardware resources that are used by the virtual machine. This
structure acts as a virtual CPU (vCPU). A vCPU includes
the registers of necessary resources to build up a virtual
environment. Table I shows the hardware resources involved
in a vCPU, which are divided into two privilege levels.
Mini-NOVA permits the frequently-accessed resources to
be directly programmed by the virtual machine, except
for the hardware states that may affect the microkernel
or other virtual machines. For example, interrupt status
registers can only be accessed by the privileged code of the
microkernel to prevent malicious users disabling interrupts
and monopolizing the CPU. While switching between virtual
machines, Mini-NOVA saves the current virtual machine’s
vCPU state and restores its successor’s state. To reduce the
switch overhead, the vector floating-point (VFP) coprocessor
and cache control registers use the lazy switching, meaning
that their contexts are switched passively, instead of actively
at every virtual machine switch. The reason is that they are
relatively less frequently accessed and quite expensive to
save.
To host the vCPU content and organize the virtual ma-
chine capabilities in the kernel domain, a kernel object
Protection Domain (PD) is applied. A Protection domain
acts as a resource container and a capability interface
between a virtual machine and the microkernel. It holds
the state of a virtual machine (the ID number, the priority
level, etc). To handle sensitive operations in the virtual
machine domain, PD includes an exception interface, which
receives exceptions and hypercalls, and distributes them
to different capability portals according to the exception’s
type. Normally, hypercalls are used to replace frequently-
used sensitive operations in order to avoid frequent traps
Figure 2.3: Mini-NOVA Architecture Overview
2.6.3 TZVisor Project
TZVisor Project12, are a set of TrustZone-assisted hypervisors, developed and maintained by
the Embedded System Research Group (ESRG), part of the ALGORITMI center of University of
Minho. The hypervisors RTZVisor, µRTZvisor and LTZVisor belong to the TZVisor Project, all of
them rely on on TrustZone hardware.
LTZVisor[PPG+17], is an open-source lightweight TrustZone-assisted hypervisor mainly target-
ing the consolidation of mixed-criticallity systems. LTZVisor implements a dual-guest OS configura-
tion: the secur world hosts the RTOS and the hypervisor, while the non-secure world is assigned
to the GPOS. Currently, there are two versions: the single-core version and t e multicore version
that follows an AMP scheme.
RTZVisor[PTM16a] is a monolithic hypervisor which takes advantage of the ARM’s TrustZone
security hardware extensions to implement a minimal separation kernel, that allowing the execu-
tion of multiple real-time guest OSs. All hypervisor components, drivers and other critical parts
of the virtualization infrastructure run in the most privileged processor mode, i.e., the monitor
mode. Guest OSs are multiplexed on the non-secure world side. The hypervisor follows a simple
and static implementation pproach. All data structures and hardware resources ar predefined
and configured at design time, avoiding the use of language dynamic features. The strong spatial
isolation is ensured through the TZASC, by dynamically changing the security state of the memory
1http://www.tzvisor.org/
2https://github.com/tzvisor/ltzvisor
22 Chapter 2. Background, Context and State of the Art
62 Chapter 4. mRTZvisor - Microkernel-like TrustZone Virtualization
The main feature of µRTZVisor is its microkernel-like architecture, depicted
in Figure 4.1. Nevertheless, the main goal of this design was not to implement
traditional microkernel virtualization, which, given its para-virtualization nature,
imposes heavy guest source-code modification. We aim at gathering those ideas
that benefit security and design flexibility, while persevering the RTZVisor’s ca-
pability of running nearly unmodified guest OSes. RTZVisor guests can make full
use of all originally intended privileged levels, being allowed to directly config-
ure assigned system resources, manage their own page tables and directly receive
their assigned interrupts. This has a disadvantage as these guest OSes need to be
compiled and cooperate to execute in the confinement of their assigned segments
given the TrustZone memory segmentation model (see Section 3.1). Besides this,
guest OSes need to be modified only if they are required to use auxiliary services
or shared resources that rely on the kernel’s IPC facilities, i.e., if they need to be
para-virtualized and emit hypercalls. For this, typically used commodity operat-
ing systems, such as Linux, may simply add kernel module drivers to expose these
mechanisms to user applications.
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Figure 4.1: µRTZVisor basic architecture.
µRTZVisor privilege code runs in monitor mode, the most privileged level in
TrustZone-enabled processors, having complete access and configuration rights
over all system resources. This layer strives to be a minimal TCB, implementing
only essential infrastructure to provide the virtual machine abstraction, spatial
and temporal partitioning, and basic services such as controlled communication
channels. The kernel’s design aims for generality and flexibility so that new func-
tionality can be added in a secure manner. For this, it provides a heterogeneous
partition environment. As described above, we inherit from RTZVisor the coarse-
grained partitions based on the memory segmentation model used to run guest
OSes. In addition, µRTZVisor supports finer-grained partitions that execute in
secure user mode and are implemented by managing page tables used by the
MMU’s secure interface, which allows for a greater degree of control over their
Figure 2.4: ￿RTZVisor Architecture Overvi w
segments. Only the guest partition currently running in the non-secure side has its own memory
segment configured as non-secure, while the remaining me ory is configured as secure.
The ￿RTZVisor[MAC+17], is a refactoring of RTZVisor, following an object-oriented approach
and the MISRA coding guidelines. ￿RTZVisor follows a microkernel like architecture, maintaining
its predecessor’s ability of executing coarse-grained partitions in a quasi full-virtualized environ-
ment, while providing support for small user-mode tasks, intended to execute system services as
extensions of the hypervisor. It provides much more functionality, real-time capabilities and con-
figuration flexibility. This includes the addition of a capability-based access control and hypercall
system, and a flexible IPC infrastructure tightly-coupled with the scheduling mechanism ensuring
fast and efficient partition interaction. Figure 2.4 illustrate the ￿RTZVisor hypervisor architeture.
3. Platform and Tools
In this chapter, the base tools and platforms which lay the groundwork for the work carried
out in this thesis are described. It starts by pointing out the selected platform and the features
that are require for this project. Then a concise survey on the operating systems (OS), FreeRTOS
and Linux, that provides the groundwork for this project will be made. In last subsection, we
provide an overview of LTZVisor, an open-source lightweight TrustZone-assisted hypervisor mainly
targeting the consolidation of mixed-criticality systems.
3.1 Zynq Platform
The Zynq-7000 family is based on the Xilinx All Programmable SoC (AP SoC) architecture,
which integrates a feature-rich single or dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 based processing system (PS)
and Xilinx programmable logic (PL) in a single device [CEES14]. A block diagram depicting the
Zynq-7000 AP SoC architecture is presented in Figure 3.1.
All Zynq devices have the same basic architecture, and all of them contain, as the basis of
the processing system, a ARM Cortex-A9 processor. This is a ”hard” processor, which means
it exists as a silicon element on the device. The ARM Cortex-A9 CPU(s) is/are the heart of the
PS, but the Zynq processing system encompasses also a set of associated computational units
forming an application processing unit (APU), as well as further peripheral interfaces, cache,
and memory interfaces. The APU is endowed with one or two ARM processing cores, each with
associated computational units such as a NEON engine and floating-point unit (FPU), a memory
management unit MMU, and a Level 1 data and instruction cache (both of which are 32KB). The
APU also contains a Level 2 cache of 512KB for instructions and data, and there is a further
256KB of on-chip memory within the APU.
The second part of the Zynq architecture is the programmable logic. It is based on the Artix-7
and Kintex-7 field-programmable gate array (FPGA) fabric, depending on the specific device of
Zynq family. The PL is predominantly composed of general purpose FPGA logic fabric, which is
composed of slices (flip-flops, LUTs, and other logic) and configurable logic blocks, input/output
blocks for interfacing, and other special resources such as block RAMs.
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Figure 3.1: Zynq-7000 SoC
Interactions between the PS and the PL are supported through a set of nine Advanced eX-
tensible Interface (AXI) interfaces, each of which is composed of multiple channels. The current
version is AXI4, which is part of the ARM Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture (AMBA) 3.0
open standard.
There are a number of Zynq-based development boards. For example, the ZC702 Zynq de-
vice, ZedBoard and ZYBO (diminutive of Zynq Board). Zedboard was the selected platform. The
ZedBoard is a low-cost, community-based board which features a XC7Z020 Zynq device. It is
a joint venture between Xilinx, Avnet (the distributor), and Digilent (the board manufacturer).
The Zynq device interfaces a 256 Mbit flash memory and 512MB DDR3 memory. There are
diverse peripheral interfaces on the ZedBoard: general purpose I/O, HDMI and VGA video, Eth-
ernet, USB-OTG (peripherals), USB-JTAG (programming), and USB-UART (communication), SD
card slot, FMC interface, and Xilinx JTAG header.
3.1.1 Security
Zynq-7000 devices provide a wide range of security features which offer protection of the inter-
nal functionality of the system, ranging from dedicated hardware support for multiple encryption
standards, secure system boot facilities, and software execution protection. The remainder of
this Section briefly introduces the security features provided by Zynq devices.
Zynq-7000 devices have a number of embedded blocks which can support the creation of
secure systems. The functionality of these security IPs includes anti-tamper, trust and informa-
tion assurance, to protect the system from power-on and through runtime [GP09]. These blocks
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include authentication, decryption engines, key storage and unique device identification possibil-
ities. Some of the features of Zynq devices which relate to security are listed as follows:
• ARM TrustZone support (PS and PL);
• Secure configuration and boot (PS and PL);
• AES-256 encryption (BBRAM key and eFUSE key);
• HMAC bitstream authentication;
• First stage boot loader (FSBL) RSA-2048 authentication;
• JTAG disable/monitor.
The need for preventing unwanted access to the internal device data or memory does not end
after the boot process has completed, and, obviously, there is a need to provide runtime security.
One feature of Zynq devices which can prevent such vulnerabilities is the Zynq specific im-
plementation of ARM TrustZone technology [2.13, 2.1]. As previously explained, the Zynq-7000
SoC is divided into two domains: a processing system and a programmable logic domain. The
Zynq-7000 AP SoC supports ARM TrustZone technology in both the PS and PL domains of the
device. The PS provides a set of configuration registers related to TrustZone support for all hard
custom blocks. These configuration registers can be dynamically programmed during software
execution. In the PL, a security-checking feature is provided for each master interface slot in the
AXI interconnect IP. A static secure or non-secure status can be assigned to an AXI interconnect
master interface slot. All slave IP cores instantiated in the logic can also be individually assigned a
secure or non-secure designation. For Xilinx slave 1glsIP cores, secure/non-secure configuration
can be designated also at the AXI interconnect level.
3.2 Linux
Linux is an monolithic Unix-like operating system assembled under the model of free and
open-source software development and distribution. It is a general-purpose operating system
originally developed for personal computers based on the Intel x86 architecture, but which has
been ported to a multitude of mainly MMU-enabled platforms, and has been used on ARM-based
platforms for decades. Linux implements a monolithic kernel, which means it handles process
management, networking, access to the peripherals, and file systems in kernel space. Device
drivers are either integrated directly into the kernel, or added as modules that are loaded while the
system is running. Its application goes from desktop and server computers to home appliances
to smartphones, cars, low-end devices, and plenty other sectors.
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Linux has a huge user base and support community, and the possibility of compiling the
kernel is a major advantage. When adding new hardware, there are lots of resources necessary
for adding drivers, and it is possible that in the open-source community someone has already
developed such driver. Different Linux distributions have been ported to several Zynq-based plat-
forms. For example, the Xilinx Linux distribution, the Linaro Linux distribution, and Digilent Linux
distribution. All of them have support for ZC702, Zedboard and ZYBO platforms.
Xilinx Zynq Linux12, from Xilinx Inc. 3, is based on open source Linux Kernel. Xilinx provides
support for Zynq specific parts of the Linux kernel (drivers and BSP). Also supports Linux through
the Embedded Linux forum. As with many open source projects, Xilinx also expects customers to
also use the open source mailing lists for Linux in areas that are not specific to Xilinx Zynq. There
are plenty third parties that produce many drivers that are compatible to the Xilinx processor or
silicon configurations, like the HDMI transmitter IP from Analog Devices Inc.
3.2.1 HDMI Transmitter driver
When adding a display into an embedded platform — whether it be a low resolution, internal
LCD panel or an external display output via HDMI — the system must be able to support it. The
degree of support that is necessary depends on the specific application but it can generally be split
into two levels: driver support and graphical interface support. In some heterogeneous platforms
resources, such as the HDMI Transmitter driver, does not have a on-chip directly connected to the
hard-wire processor. Instead, these resources need to connect firstly to the programmable logic
(PL) and then the PL connects to the processor system in order to give software access to these
peripherals.
The ADV7511 is a 225 MHz High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) transmitter. This
reference design made by Analog Devices provides the video and audio interface between the
FPGA and ADV7511 Hardware description language (HDL) reference on board. The Analog De-
vices provides device drivers for Linux, API and tutorials to implement the reference design. This
device will be exploited to allow graphical interface to the non-secure guest, i.e. Linux. Assigning
the same level of security of the guest who employ the HDMI peripheral.
3.3 FreeRTOS
FreeRTOS4 is an open-source RTOS designed to be deployed on embedded systems with
scarce resources. It is characterized by a very simple and small kernel core, written mostly in
1http://www.wiki.xilinx.com/Linux
2https://github.com/Xilinx/linux-xlnx
3https://xilinx.com
4https://www.freertos.org
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C, presenting a software architecture divided into two main layers: the ”hardware independent”
and the ”portable” layer [Bar10]. The former is responsible for performing processor indepen-
dent functions and is maintained intact for all architectures, while the second implements some
architecture-specific routines (e.g. context-switching).
3.3.1 Structure
The FreeRTOS source structure is very small [Bar09]: the core of the RTOS kernel is contained
in only three C files. The tasks.c file provides a set of task management functionalities, including
the scheduler component. FreeRTOS implements a preemptive priority-based scheduler policy,
which privileges the execution of the highest priority tasks. For tasks with the same priority, the
scheduler follows a round-robin model. In addition, the list.c file implements a list data structure
for maintaining task queues (ready, waiting and running). These two files, altogether with the
port specific code, implement the minimum core kernel high-level functionalities. The optional
file queue.c implements a list of queues used for inter-task communication and synchronization.
The timers.c file offers a set of functions to implement software timers used by application tasks.
The operating system features also a special type of tasks, called ”co-routines”, that present high
memory efficiency. These tasks are implemented within croutine.c file. The port.c file contains
not only the hardware-specific code, but also the standard API of the OS. At last, the heap.c file
provides the memory allocation and deallocation functionality, specific to the target architecture.
The FreeRTOS kernel can be tailored to the application being built through a configuration file
called FreeRTOSConfig.h, where it is possible to adjust clock speed, heap size, mutual exclusion
objects, API subsets, etc. Moreover, as an open-source RTOS with a small and simple kernel, it
is possible to change the internals with a small engineering effort. These set of advantages and
features justified the use of FreeRTOS as the target RTOS for this work.
3.3.2 Task Management
Tasks are implemented as C functions. The only thing special about them is their prototype,
which must return void and take a void pointer parameter. Each task is a small program in its
own right. An application can consist of many tasks. If the processor running the application
contains a single core, then only one task can be executing at any given time. This implies that
a task can exist, from an high-level perspective, in one of two states: Running and Not Running.
As there are several reasons for a task not to be running, the ”Not running” state can be
expanded as shows Figure 3.2. A task can be preempted because of an higher priority task
(scheduling is described in section 3.3.3), has been delayed or because it waiting for a event.
When a task is ready to run but is waiting for the processor to be available, its state is said ”Ready”.
This can happen when a task has is ready to run but there is a more priority task running at this
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Figure 3.2: Task state machine
time. When a task is delayed or is waiting for another task (synchronisation through semaphores
or mutexes) a task is said to be ”Blocked”. Finally, a call to vTaskSuspend() and vTaskResume()
or xTaskResumeFromISR() makes the task going in and out the ”Suspend” state.
The scheduler is the only entity that can promote a task for the Running state. Tasks can
only be transitioned to the Running state from the Ready state. A task in Running state can exit
on its own. However, the scheduler is the only service that can transit a task from Ready to
Running state. If the task calls the vTaskSuspend() its state will become suspended and them
the scheduler will select the task with higher priority ready for execution - Ready state. A task
can also move from Ready to Blocked by waiting for an event. Events can be of two types:
timing and synchronization events. When a task needs to be delayed for a certain number of
ticks or for a specific amount time, for the vTaskDelay() and vTaskDelayUntil() services can be
used, respectively. For synchronization events, FreeRTOS offers several features such as queues,
semaphores, countdown lights, recursive semaphores, mutexes. When using synchronization
events a timeout can be set; this means the task will exit the Blocked state as soon as its event
occurs or when the assigned timeout expires.
The maximum number of priorities that can be assigned to tasks is defined by the constant
configMAX_PRIORITIES. FreeRTOS does not impose any limitation on this value but the higher
the number of priorities, the more RAM will be consumed by the OS, because for each priority
a list of ready tasks is created. In certain platforms that present a ”count leading zeros” type
instruction in its Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) , the FreeRTOS provides a task selection mech-
anism (configUSE_PORT_OPTIMISED_TASK_SELECTION) that uses such type of instruction. In
this case, the maximum number of priorities (configMAX_PRIORITIES) need to be bellow than
thirty two priorities, whereas in other cases, configMAX_PRIORITIES can take any value. How-
ever, system designers need to take in mind, the lower the priority the less resources the system
will need.
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3.3.2.1 Task Lists
In order to manage the tasks, FreeRTOS assigns to each task a data structure, called a Task
Control Block (TCB). Figure 3.3 shows this data structure. For each task is assigned a memory
space, called stack. The TCB stores important information for the management of this stack,
using three pointers for this purpose: pxTopOfStack, pxStack, and pxEndOfStack. The pxTopOfS-
tack is a pointer to the last item placed on the task stack. The pxTopOfStack and pxTopOfStack
point to the beginning and end of the stack, respectively. The TCB has also information regarding
the task priority (uxPriority) and name (pcTaskName). The xGenericListItem structure is used to
point to one of this lists, Ready, Suspended, and the xEventListItem points to the corresponded
Block list.
Lists can be used as First In, First Out (FIFO) through the vListInsertEnd() function or as a
list sorted by a value. The lists declared by default are: a list of ready tasks (pxReadyTasksLists);
a list of tasks that are waiting for a temporary event (xDelayedTaskList); and list of tasks that
were acknowledged by the scheduler while it was suspended (xPendingReadyList) and moved to
the ready list when the scheduler resumes. There are other lists such as deleted tasks list and
suspended task list which are used by the vTaskDelete() and vTaskSuspend() APIs functions
The tasks that are waiting for a temporary event are stored in the xDelayed_TaskList This list
sort the tasks by their number of ticks left to unlock. FreeRTOS implements two identical lists
for time events to troubleshoot problems associated with the count timer overflow. The pxDe-
layedTaskList pointer points to the list that is currently in use and the pxOverflowDelayedTaskList
pointer points to the list which saves the tasks that will be unlocked after the overflow of the tick
count. After an overflow occurs, FreeRTOS swap lists.
FreeRTOS implements some time facilities this by providing for each task a dedicated software-
based counter, that is decremented at each system tick. In a complex system, where it is likely
to exist several timers active, the management and activation of the task represent a source of
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jitter.
3.3.3 Scheduler
A task transitioned from the Not Running state to the Running state is said to have been
”switched in” or ”swapped in”. Conversely, a task transitioned from the Running state to the Not
Running state is said to have been ‘switched out’ or ”swapped out”. The FreeRTOS scheduler is
the only entity that can switch a task in and out.
The FreeRTOS scheduler has two modes of operation: preemptive scheduling based on pri-
orities and cooperative scheduling. The scheduling mode must be chosen by the system user
through the configUSE_PREEMPTION parameter in the FreeRTOSConfig.h file. If this parame-
ter preemptive scheduling will be used, otherwise, it will be used cooperative scheduling. The
preemptive scheduling algorithm can be summarized in four points as:
• Each task has an associated priority.
• Each task exists in one of the states.
• At any time only one task is running (Runnning state).
• The scheduler chooses to always execute the task with higher priority with Ready state.
In summary, the preemptive algorithm selects the task ready-to-run with the higest priority
choose the task ready-to-run that has the higgest priority. For tasks with the same priority, the
scheduler follows a round-robin model, where at each tick the running task swap for another task
with the same priority, providing the same time slice for every task with the same priority. The
duration of on slice time is inversely proportional to the frequency of the system tick that is defined
by the parameter configTICK_RATE_HZ.
3.3.4 Synchronization Mechanisms
The binary semaphores, semaphores, mutexes, queues and task notifications are used to
synchronize tasks with other tasks or interrupt services routines (ISRs). These synchronization
mechanisms can be used to unblock a task each time a particular interrupt, effectively synchroniz-
ing the task with the interrupt. This allows the majority of the event processing to be implemented
within the synchronized task, with only a very fast and short portion remaining directly in the ISR.
Binary semaphores and mutexes are very similar but have a subtle differences: mutexes in-
clude a priority inheritancemechanism, binary semaphores do not. This makes binary semaphores
a better choice for implementing synchronisation (between tasks or between tasks and an inter-
rupt), and mutexes a better choice for implementing simple mutual exclusion. The description of
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how a mutex can be used as a mutual exclusion mechanism holds equally for binary semaphores.
FreeRTOS declare binary semaphores and mutexes as a queue that can only hold one item. The
queue can therefore only be empty or full (hence binary). Tasks and interrupts using the queue
don’t care what the queue holds - they only want to know if the queue is empty or full. This
mechanism can be exploited to synchronise (for example) a task with an interrupt. Counting
semaphores are also declare as queues with a length greater than one.
3.3.5 Software Timers
Software timers are used to schedule the execution of a function at a set time in the future,
or periodically with a fixed frequency. The function executed by the software timer is called the
software timer’s callback function. This feature is implemented by, and are under the control
of, the FreeRTOS kernel, and it is optional to include in the OS. They do not require hardware
support, and are not related to hardware timers or hardware counters. In line with the FreeRTOS
philosophy of using innovative design to ensure maximum efficiency, software timers do not use
any processing time unless a software timer callback function is actually executing.
Software timer functionality is easy to implement, but difficult to implement efficiently. The
FreeRTOS implementation does not execute timer callback functions from an interrupt context,
does not consume any processing time unless a timer has actually expired, does not add any
processing overhead to the tick interrupt, and does not walk any link list structures while interrupts
are disabled. However, the task that does the tick handler add some indeterminism and so the
software timers normally aren’t so precise.
3.4 LTZVisor
LTZVisor [PPG+17], from TZVisor Project56, is an open-source lightweight TrustZone-assisted
hypervisor. This section overviews the LTZVisor architecture as well as the AMP implementation.
3.4.1 General Architecture
LTZVisor targets the consolidation of mixed-criticality systems, and implements a classical
dual-guest OS configuration: the secure world hosts the RTOS and the hypervisor, while the non-
secure world is assigned to the general-purpose operating system (GPOS). Figure 3.4 depicts the
LTZVisor system architecture.
The hypervisor runs in the highest privileged processor mode, i.e. the monitor mode. It is
responsible for enforcing the inter-partition isolation, by configuring the security state of memory,
5http://www.tzvisor.org/
6https://github.com/tzvisor/ltzvisor
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Figure 3.4: LTZVisor system architecture.
devices, and interrupts. The RTOS kernel runs in the secure supervisor mode. Therefore, it has
full view over the non-secure privileged software, which means it is part of the trusted computing
base (TCB) and necessarily must have a small footprint. The GPOS kernel runs in non-secure
supervisor partition. The secure partition is completely isolated from the non-secure partition,
and any attempt from the non-secure guest OS to access any of the secure world resources will
immediately trigger an exception to be handled by the hypervisor.
LTZVisor implements an asymmetric or idle scheduler. This scheduling policy guarantees
that the non-secure guest OS is only scheduled during the idle periods of the secure guest OS,
and the secure guest OS can preempt the execution of the non-secure one. As a result, LTZVisor
overcomes the hierarchical scheduling problem that most real-time environment virtualization
solutions enjoy [ZMH15]. Typically, a hypervisor schedules virtual CPUs while a guest RTOS
running over the virtual CPU schedules its own tasks.
Spatial isolation between guest OSs is enforced by the TrustZone-aware hardware. The hy-
pervisor uses the TZASC to configure the security state of the memory blocks of the respective
partition.
Regarding the interrupt subsystem, LTZVisor follows the suggested ARMmodel, assigning fast
interrupt requests (FIQs) to the secure partition and interrupt requests (IRQs) to the non-secure
partition. While executing in the non-secure world, FIQs are set to be handled by the hypervisor.
When an FIQ occurs while non-secure guest is executing, the hypervisor will then trigger a context-
switch to the secure partition, resulting in minimal interrupt latencies for the real-time OS. This
guarantees the secure guest
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Figure 3.5: LTZVisor AMP architecture.
3.4.2 LTZVisor-AMP: Multicore Extension
LTZVisor-AMP implements support for a supervised asymmetric multi-processing (AMP) con-
figuration [POP+17]. In such schema one core runs in the secure world and hosts the secure
software (LTZVisor and RTOS), while the other core runs in the non-secure world and is responsible
for hosting the non-secure software (GPOS). Current implementation is limited to the one-to-one
mapping between core, guests and worlds. Figure 3.5 depicts the LTZVisor-AMP architecture.
For easing development and to avoid modifications to the Linux kernel, the GPOS runs over
the primary core - core 0. This means the real-time OS, running on the secure world side, is
assigned to the secondary core - core 1.
The multicore extension solves the problem of starvation which occurs in single-core platforms
(when the RTOS does not yield its control of the CPU), while presenting significant performance
advantages when the RTOS has a heavy workload [POP+17]. Nevertheless, the fact typical real-
time application have frequent idle time, which making the CPU unusable on those time slices is
not availed non-secure guest OS performance increase.
3.5 Benchmarks
Benchmarking and performance analysis are a well-established method of comparing the
performance of various subsystems across different processors and system architectures. Several
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benchmark suites exist targeting different metrics, systems and domains. This section provides
a quick look over the Benchmark suites used during the development of this thesis, explaining
the main reasons behind their choice.
3.5.1 Thread-Metric
The Thread-Metric benchmark suite7, from Express Logic, is a freely-available set of bench-
marks that measures many aspects of RTOS performance. Criteria such as interrupt response,
context-switching, message passing, thread scheduling, memory allocation, and synchronization
are particularly important when evaluating an RTOS. Thread-Metric consists of the following bench-
marks: cooperative context switching, preemptive context switching, Interrupt processing, inter-
rupt processing with preemption, semaphore processing, message passing, and memory alloca-
tion and deallocation. Each benchmark outputs a counter value, representing the RTOS impact
on the running application: the higher the value, the smaller the impact.
The number of benchmarks available for evaluating the RTOS overhead/performance is
scarce. Thread-Metric has been widely used across academia and industry. It has the advantage
of being freely available and made open-source by Express Logic. It is also easily adapted to
other RTOSs, just by mapping the generic APIs into the RTOS-specific APIs. No special hardware
is required, and the code was tested with various compilers.
3.5.2 LMBench
LMBench [MS96] is a widely known suite of simple and portable micro-benchmarks used for
measuring the most important factors that affect system performance, such as bandwidth and
latency. The timing harness is the heart of the system, because it manages the benchmarking
process: starting the benchmarked activity, repeating the benchmarked activity as long as nec-
essary to ensure accurate results, and finally managing statistics to report representative results.
The suite is written in portable ANSI-C using POSIX interfaces and targeting UNIX systems.
The LMBench 3.0 suite includes more than forty micro-benchmarks within three different
categories:
• bandwidth - file read, memory read/write/copy, memory map, and others;
• latency - memory latency, inter-process communication using Transmission;
• Miscellaneous - CPU clock speed, translation lookaside buffer (TLB) size, cache line size,
arithmetic operations parallelism, memory parallelism, and others.
7http://rtos.com/PDFs/MeasuringRTOSPerformance.pdf
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There are a signifcant number of available benchmarks for GPOSs, namely targeting different
architectural components. LMBench provides a plethora of microbenchmarks, in the same suite,
ranging from computing intensive (e.g., arithmetic operations) to memory, communication and
I/O intensive tests. Its availability as an open-source tool, as well as its widespread in Unix
platforms, make it an attractive option compared to other benchmark suites. The benchmarks
are all in C, and so, fairly portable. The source is small and easy to extend.

4. Trust SecSi Code: A TrustZone-assisted
Secure Silicon Co-design Framework
This chapter intends to provide details regarding the implementation of the TrustZone-assisted
Secure Silicon Co-design framework (Trust SecSi CoDe). The framework development was split
into three parts: (i) development of a hardware-software RTOS that is FreeRTOS application com-
patible; (ii) modified Zynq Linux for supporting multicore and graphical interface; (iii) modified
version of the hypervisor LTZVisor to integrate the software-hardware RTOS and the multicore
GPOS guest.
4.1 Overview
LTZVisor provides a virtualization solution based on the two virtual execution environments
provided by the TrustZone hardware. Notwithstanding, it is believed that the exploration of recon-
figurable computing can bring several benefits and present a promising approach.
The main design principle of the co-designed framework continues to be the same as LTZVi-
sor’s: rely on TrustZone hardware support as much as possible. In addition, it exploits field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) technology to offload secure software services (RTOS) to hard-
ware, and improve the GPOS performance and utility without compromising any real-time dead-
line. Figure 4.1 depicts the proposed hardware-software co-designed architecture. In this figure,
three main software components can be identified: the hypervisor; the real-time guest OS; the
general-purpose guest OS. Figure 4.1 also presents two main hardware subsystems: RTOS related
services and the HDMI Transmitter Interface.
LTZVisor runs in the highest privileged processor mode, i.e., in monitor mode. The hypervisor,
follows an AMP schema, which mean it is split into two parts. The core of the hypervisor is the
master of the system and is responsible for the main tasks, configuring memory, interrupts and
devices assigned to each guest OS, as well as guaranteeing run-time support for inter-partition
communication (IPC). LTZVisor kept the core of the system running in the secondary core - core
1 (to avoid severe modifications on the Linux guest [POP+17]). This limitation of the current
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Figure 4.1: Trust SecSi CoDe system architecture.
approach is addressed in this framework by providing the flexibility of executing the hypervisor’s
main layer in either core.
The real-time guest OS kernel runs in the supervisor mode of the secure world and was
assigned to the main core - core 0. This VM must have a small footprint, because, when the
processor state is secure, it has full view over the non-secure world side. Nonetheless, offloading
RTOS services to hardware also bring benefits in terms of security, due to the contention of the
software TCB.
The general-purpose guest OS kernel runs in the supervisor mode of the non-secure world
side. LTZVisor-AMP, which obeys a rigid AMP schema where each guest executed is in a dedicated
core, this framework brings a higher degree of flexibility and scalability for the implemented AMP
configuration. In this sense, the rich or multimedia OS has permission to explore secondary cores
during the idle periods of the RTOS. This approach does not induce non-secure VM starvation, as
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there will be always one core dedicated for this VM, like in LTZVisor-AMP. Nevertheless, this will
not affect the secure VM’s execution since TrustZone technology guarantees, by design, that the
non-secure world is always less privileged than the secure one, despite the CPU execution mode.
In behalf of ensuring the hard real-time requirement of critical software, some RTOS services
were oflloaded to the reconfigurable logic fabric. The scheduler, mutexes and the kernel software
timers services represent the major sources of jitter and overhead [KGJ03] in RTOSes and there-
fore, are major candidates for hardware offloading. The RTOS hardware subsystem is agnostic
from the RTOS software implementation that might be running in the secure world.
The HDMI Transmitter IP, which is supported by Analog Devices, provides graphical interface
for the GPOS and thereforethe FPGA hardware is configured with the security state as as the
associated operating system. The supplier also provides the necessary software driver compatible
with Linux OS.
4.2 Secure VM (Hardware-Software RTOS)
Since in LTZVisor’s architecture the RTOS is part of the TCB of the system, both hypervisor
and RTOS layers act synergically. In order to reduce the software TCB and meet the strict timing
requirements and constraints imposed by real-time systems, some RTOS services were deployed
in the reconfigurable hardware.
The coexistence of a hybrid, software and hardware model in an operating system environ-
ment, raises concerns namely regarding an unified programming model, portability, legacy soft-
ware support, suitable interface and synchronization mechanisms, communication overhead and
resource optimization [ZQCP05, WCW+09, NA07, POP+14], eventually exacerbated in resource
constrained embedded contexts.
Determinism and latency are the critical metrics of these systems. Migrating tasks and ser-
vices from software to hardware help to mitigate/aleviate these issues, leading to solutions able to
cope with these increasingly strict requirements. Migration of RTOS services, such as scheduling,
time management and task management, to dedicated hardware modules, provides increased
system performance and allows the RTOS to improve predictability and determinism [MNK14].
To distinguish between the original FreeRTOS and the implemented co-design, the hybrid system
will be named hardware-software RTOS.
4.2.1 System Structure
For the purpose of this project, the task management service, the scheduler, synchronization
service, and the software timers feature, were the implemented hardware services. Figure 4.2
illustrates the architecture of the hardware-software RTOS.
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Figure 4.2: Hardware-Software Co-design RTOS architecture
In order to maintain the same FreeRTOS API, the source code was extended with conditional
compilation entries. To enable the co-designed system, a new configuration parameter was cre-
ated, called configRTOS_CODESIGN. When enabled, the classic services available in software are
replaced by its respective hardware implementation. Listing 4.1 is an example of modification in
the tick ISR, FreeRTOS_Tick_Handler() located in port.c.
Listing 4.1: FreeRTOS_Tick_Handler() modification
void FreeRTOS_Tick_Handler( void )
{
/* If the Hardware-Software Co-Design
configuration is enable. */
#if ( configRTOS_CODESIGN == 1 )
ulPortYieldRequired = pdTRUE;
#else /* configRTOS_CODESIGN */
/* Increment the RTOS tick. */
if ( xTaskIncrementTick() != pdFALSE )
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{
ulPortYieldRequired = pdTRUE;
}
#endif /* configRTOS_CODESIGN */
/* Ensure all interrupt priorities are active again. */
portCLEAR_INTERRUPT_MASK();
configCLEAR_TICK_INTERRUPT();
}
The functions that interface with the hardware modules are implemented as INLINE in the
header files started with the nomenclature ”secsirtos_”. They are defined as ”inline functions”since
they just implement read and write operations on the AXI4-LITE communication. The AXI4-LITE
communication is the main peripheral bridge between programmable logic and processing sys-
tem. In all hardware modules, the inputs and outputs are named with a ”_in” and a ”_out” at
the end, respectively .
4.2.2 SysTick Timer
Due to scheduler and time services hardware deployment, the timer that generates the system
tick also have to be implemented in the reconfigurable hardware for the correct use of the migrated
services. Since the timers are a generic peripheral, and Xilinx provides its own timer IPs, we have
used the AXI Timer IP.
The AXI Timer is organized as two identical timer modules. Each timer module has an asso-
ciated load register that is used to hold either the initial value for the counter for event generation,
or a capture value, depending on the mode of the timer. This timer replaces the timer used by
FreeRTOS while presenting the same characteristics, where the configuration of the frequency
used by the system tick must be done through the configuration macros that the operating sys-
tem already makes available. By using such an approach the user does not need to implement
a different configuration.
axi_timer_0
AXI Timer
S_AXI
capturetrig0
capturetrig1
generateout0
generateout1
pwm0
interrupt
freeze
s_axi_aclk
s_axi_aresetn
c_counter_binary_0
Binary Counter
CLK Q[31:0]
tick
tick_value[31:0]
tick_int
Figure 4.3: AXI Timer and the Counter IP
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Figure 4.4: Task Manager IP.
At the interrupt output, a counter has been added so that the kernel hardware can keep track
of time intervals. Figure 4.3 depicts the AXI Timer hardware module, the counter, as well as all
the connections needed between them.
4.2.3 Task Management
The task management service controls and manages the state of each task, by sorting them
in lists. It is worth mentioning that the scheduler is the only entity responsible of changing a
task from a ”ready” state to a ”running” state. Software list manipulation is a good example of
a source of unpredictability [GPG+15]. The time taken to select the next task to run in the ready
queue list of FreeRTOS’ priority-based scheduler, is very dependent on its position into the list.
In order to manage the tasks states, the hardware Task Manager IP (hTM IP) also sorts them
in lists. However, due to the parallel nature of reconfigurable platforms, the unpredictability of list
manipulation operations will be mitigated.
The hTM IP sorts the tasks ready-to-run according to their priority. There are two lists stored in
PL: Task List and Priority list. For each task, Task List saves the TCB address, ”*TCB”, the priority
number, ”Priority”, and two pointers, ”*Previous” and ”Next”, at the address of the provided task
identifier (”ID TASK”). The two pointers are used to create a doubly linked list between all ready-to-
run tasks with the same priority. For each priority, Priority List saves the ready-to-run task identifier
of the first, ”*TASK STRT”, and last, ”*TASK END” , task saved with the priority in question, as
well as the number of tasks associated, ”NUMBER ELEMENTS”.
For the tasks in temporal block state, the hTM IP sorts them in one linked list (Delay List)
instead of having two lists, one for the current tick counter and another for the after overflow of
the tick, as the original version of FreeRTOS.
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The Delay List sort the delayed tasks by order of expiration time. Starting with the task with
the lowest expiration time up to the task with the highest expiration time. To facilitate insertion
and deletion this list is doubly linked. So in each address is saved the pointers ”*Prev”, ”*Next”,
and the expiration time, ”DELAY VALUE”. The address of each Delay List element correspond to
the task identifier in question.
To establish an easy task identification between the hardware module and the software ser-
vice, the implemented approach uses the trace facilities provided by the FreeRTOS, to store the
task hardware identifier. Toward an efficient task management, the hardware module has to be
acknowledge when a task creation/deletion (vTaskCreate, vTaskDelete), or a change of task state
(vTaskDelay, vTaskDekayUntil, vTaskSuspend, vTaskResume and vTaskAbortDelay) occurs. This
module also provides access to the information of a certain task for the hardware scheduler.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the Task Manager hardware module and its I/Os.
The following sections explain how each type of task operation is implemented, as well as the
necessary inputs and outputs for each operation.
4.2.3.1 Task Create/Delete
In an application designer perspective, when a task creation occurs, several key parameters
are specified for a specific task (TCB). In a similar way, the hTM IP that implements the task
creation retains the task identifier (uxTCBNumber), the correspond TCB address (pxNewTCB)
and the assigned priority (uxPriority), while leaving the software layer to store all the remaining
information. These parameters are provided when the prvAddNewTaskToReadyList() is invoked.
For deletion operations, the hardwaremodule has to receive the task identifier (uxTCBNumber)
of the desired task. This parameter is provided when the vTaskDelete is invoked.
The creation operation is mastered by the following path:
1. Receive a signal on createTask_in and, at the same time, the values of TCB address
(addrTCB_in), priority (priority_in) and task ID (taskID_in);
2. Address the Priority List with the priority received and check if there are ready-to-run tasks
with the same priority, i.e., if the parameter ”NUMBER ELEMENTS” is not null:
(a) In case the ”NUMBER ELEMENTS” is null, (meaning that the new task is the first
ready-to-run task with that certain priority), the hTM IP can save the received param-
eters of the new task on the Task List;
(b) Else, address the last ready-to-run task on the doubly linked priority list (such infor-
mation is stored in ”*TASK END”) and updates the parameter ”*Next” so that the
new task is inserted in the linked list.
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Figure 4.5: Create and Delete Task Interface.
3. Update the ”*TASK END” with the inserted task ID and also increment the parameter
”NUMBER ELEMENTS”. In case of being the first task with a different priority from the
previous inserted ones, the ”*TASK STRT” is updated with the inserted task ID;
4. The Task List stores the TCB address and priority of the new task at the task ID provided.
The parameters ”*Prev” and ”*Next” save the previous last task and the first inserted task
with the same priority, respectively.
The deletion and suspension operations are quite similar. The main difference: the creation
operation can successfully occur on a deleted task ID, overwriting the stored task information
(see subsection 4.2.3.6). The delete operation proceeds executes as follows:
1. Receive a signal at (”deleteTask_in” and the identifier of the intended task (taskID_in)
(Figure 4.5);
2. The hTM IP obtains the priority number, the next pointer and the previous pointer by
addressing the Task List with the task ID received;
TASK A
Priority: 0x01
TASK B
Priority: 0x04
TASK C
Priority: 0x01
INACTIVE
TASK D
TASK E
Priority: 0x04
TASK F
Priority: 0x01
EMPTY
TASK G
Priority: 0x02
EMPTY
*TASK A
Elements: 3
*TASK G
Elements: 1
EMPTY
*TASK A
Elements: 2
EMPTY
TASK LIST
Priority LIST *TCB Priority *Prev *NextID TASK:
*TASK STRT *TASK END N_ELEMENTSPRIORITY:
Figure 4.6: Task List and Priority List.
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Figure 4.7: Resume and Suspend Task Interface.
3. Address the Priority List with the priority obtained and check if there are ready-to-run tasks
with the same priority, i.e., if the parameter ”NUMBER ELEMENTS” is not null:
(a) In case the ”NUMBER ELEMENTS” is null, (meaning that the intended task is the
first ready-to-run task with that certain priority), the hTM IP can just reset ”NUMBER
ELEMENTS”;
(b) Else, remove the intended task from the associated doubly linked priority list.
4. Update the ”*TASK END” in case the intended task was the last one in the doubly linked
priority list. Also the same for the ”*TASK STRT” in case the intended task was the first
one in the doubly linked priority list.
Figure 4.6 illustrate an example of how the lists will look if there are three tasks, ”Task A”,
”Task C” and ”Task F” with same priority, ”Task B” and ”Task E” with the same priority but
different of the other group, ”Task G” with a unique priority number and ”Task D” currently
suspended or blocked.
4.2.3.2 Task Resume/Suspend
The ”resume” and the ”create” operations have similar behaviour. However, the ”resume”
operation only needs the task ID because all the remain information is already stored in the Task
List (figure 4.7). Consequently, the ”resume” has an extra step before checking the Priority list
parameter ”NUMBER ELEMENTS”: get the priority number of the intended task by addressing
the Task List.
The ”suspend” operation and the deletion operation, as was previously said, are quite similar.
However, instead of allowing overwriting operations on this particular task ID, a task in suspend
state cannot be overwrited.
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Figure 4.8: Delay and Abort Delay Task Interface.
A ”resume” operation can only execute if the task was previously in suspend state. The same
goes for ”suspend” operations, these operations can only be executed if the task was previously
in ready-to-run state (see subsection 4.2.3.6).
4.2.3.3 Task Delay/Abort
FreeRTOS API presents a set of functions to delay tasks for a specific amount of number of
ticks. The actual time that the task remains blocked depends on the tick rate. vTaskDelay() and
vTaskDelayUntil() are two functions from the FreeRTOS API responsible to delay tasks. The func-
tion vTaskDelayUntil() differs from vTaskDelay() in one important aspect: vTaskDelay() specifies a
time at which the task wishes to unblock in relation to the time at which vTaskDelay() is called,
whereas vTaskDelayUntil() specifies an absolute time (rather than a relative time) at which the
task wishes to unblock.
In the implemented hardware-software RTOS, the calculations needed to determinate the
absolute time at which the calling task should unblock (vTaskDelayUntil() function) remains as
part of the software. This way, the hTM IP does not need to distinguish between a ”delay” and a
”delayuntil” operation. Figure 4.8 highlights the necessary inputs.
EMPTY
DELAY_VALUE3
0x0A
EMPTY
DELAY_VALUE1
0x90
DELAY_VALUE0
0x7F
EMPTY
DELAY_VALUE4
0x3F
DELAY LIST
ID TASK: DELAY VALUE *Prev *Next
0x6ACURRENT TICK VALUE:
Figure 4.9: Temporal Blocked List.
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In order to sort the temporal blocked tasks by their expiration time, the hTM IP presents the
following execution path:
1. Receive signal on delayTask_in, the identifier of the intended task (taskID_in), and the
expiration tick (valueDelay_in);
2. Remove the intended task from the ready-to-run list;
3. Verify if the Delay list is not empty. In case its not, there is two paths: survey until the it
find a task with a higher expiration time than the intended task or survey until the end of
the list;
4. Once the survey stops for either of the situations, the hTM IP inserts the intended task
information on the interrupted position.
To abort a temporal block of a task, the bit abortTask_in needs to be set as well as the task
identifier need to be on taskID_in. If the task was previously in the delay state, the delay will
be aborted (removing it from the Delay List) and the task becomes ready again (inserting the
intended task back to the ready-to-run linked list).
The hTM IP receives a ”delay” operation assuming that the delay time is not already expired.
The hTM IP only has one list for temporal blocked tasks, instead of two as the original version
of FreeRTOS. This approach does not compromise the maximum delay time that the tasks can
be submitted nor the number of tasks that can be in delay state at the same time. Figure 4.9
illustrates a representation of the Delay List with four tasks in delay state. The expiration time of
the tasks with the delay ”DELAY_VALUE3” and ”DELAY_VALUE4” will happen after an overflow
of the system tick.
4.2.3.4 Priority Selector
A classic RTOS implements a preemptive priority-base scheduler policy, where the scheduler
selects the task which has the highest priority. This sub-module is responsible for surveying all
ready-to-run task priorities and selecting the highest one.
0 0 0 1 … X X X X X 
63 62 61 60  4 3 2 1 0 
 
highpriority_out: 60 
 
Figure 4.10: Bit Array of Priorities
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Figure 4.11: Scheduler Interface.
The selector organizes all the ready-to-run task priorities on an array of sixty-four bits, each
bit corresponding to a priority number. When a ”create” or ”resume” operation is triggered, the
respective priority bit is set; when all the tasks with the same priority are suspended/blocked, the
bit is cleared. The output highpriority_out always contain the position of the highest priority bit
set, by doing this, so it is always possible to know which is the highest priority level. Figure 4.10
illustrates an example of the bit array were the highest priority ready-to-run task has a priority
number of 60.
4.2.3.5 Scheduler Interface
The scheduler is responsible for controlling which task goes to the running state. To allow
this, the hTM IP provides the value of the highest priority (highpriority_out), the identifier of the
first task with the high priority (highpriorityTask_out) and the identifier of the next task with the
same priority (nexttaskID_out). In addition, provides the TCB address (addrTCBrun_out) of the
task ID received on the input taskIDrun_in so the scheduler can perform the context switch if
necessary. Figure 4.11 highlights these I/Os.
4.2.3.6 State Control
The hTM IP always needs to be prepared to receive an incoming operation operation. In
addition, these operation can come from the application designer, from the scheduler, from the
syncronization services, from the software timer module or even from internal operation (for
example when a ”delay” operation occurs, the hTM IP also needs to remove the intended task
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from the ready-to-run list). Before handling any of these commands, this module first verifies if the
operation can be executed, them stores each valid operation in a circular buffer. If the necessary
operation is possible, executes the saved operation.
In order to be a valid command, it is necessary to check the following rules:
• If the task is in resume state, all commands are valid, except ”abort delays” or ”create”
commands;
• If the task is in suspend state, the ”resume” command is the only valid one;
• An ”abort delay” can only happen if the task is in delay state.
4.2.4 Scheduler
The scheduler has two modes of operation: preemptive or cooperative. If the preemptive
mode is chosen, the scheduler preempts the ready-to-run task who has the highest priority, and
when a prioritized tie occurs, the scheduler resolves it using the round robin strategy with time
slice. This means that tasks with the same priority share CPU access when running alternately.
The hardware Scheduler IP (hS IP) controls which task starts to execute and which task gets
out of the running state. The scheduler algorithm becomes less complex, as a result of the lists
structure design. The hS IP was simplified in a way that it has only two assignments:
• Update the task in running state when the highest priority level is updated;
• When a systick is set and the highest priority did not change, the scheduler preempts the
next task with the same priority than the previous running task.
Figure 4.13 depicts the behaviour through a state machine diagram. The state machine has
three states: IDLE, TICK and PRIORITY. The hS IP starts at IDLE state. If the tick_in is set, the
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Figure 4.12: Scheduler IP.
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Figure 4.13: Scheduler State Machine.
module transits to the state TICK or if the highpriorityTask_in is updated, the module transits
to the state PRIORITY. In PRIORITY state, the hS IP updates the register taskIDrun_out with the
value on highpriorityTask_in and then returns to IDLE state. In TICK state, the scheudler updates
the taskIDrun_out with the value nexttaskID_in and then returns to IDLE state.
The hS IP not only controls the TCB address of the task to run (addrTCBrun_out) , but also
commands the tick interrupt (tick_out). The hS IP only sends an interrupt when a tick is triggered
and a context switch is necessary. Therefore, the RTOS ensures that every time a tick handler is
called, a context switch need to occur. By mitigating interrupts that would be useless, it improves
the performance of each task that runs for more than one time slice.
FreeRTOS has a tickless feature, Tickless Idle Mode [Bar10] that suspends the system timer
when the system is in idle time. This feature allows the microcontroller to remain in a deep power
saving state (or in this virtualization context, used for non-secure world purposes), until either an
interrupt occurs, or it is time for the RTOS kernel to transition a task into the ready-to-run state.
The hS IP not only provides this feature, but also does not interrupt the processing of a high
priority task, when there is not an higher process to attend.
Figure 4.14 illustrates a case scenario running on three different schedulers: (i) original
FreeRTOS scheduler; (ii) FreeRTOS scheduler with Tickless Idle Mode enabled; (iii) implemented
hardware-software RTOS scheduler. The case scenario consists of three ready-to-run tasks: ”Task
D” has the higher priority, and ”Task A” and ”Task B” have equal low priority. Each scheduler
starts executing ”Task D” for 2 system ticks. Then, executes ”Task B” and ”Task A” for for one
time slice each. Ending with each scheduler in idle state.
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Figure 4.14: Comparison between different scheduler behaviours during system ticks
4.2.5 Software Timers Service
A software timer (or just a ”timer”) allows a function to be executed at a set time in the
future. The function executed by the timer is called the timer’s callback function. The time
between a timer being started, and its callback function being executed, is called the timer’s
period. The hardware ”Software Timers” IP (hST IP) intends to replace the software functionality
that is responsible for delaying the timer task and also migrating the indeterministic processing
portion that checks if a timer has expired. Figure 4.15 illustrates the inputs and outputs of this
module.
Before any timer creation, the hST IP must receive the task ID of the timers handler task
(timerTaskID_in). The hST IP is responsible of resuming this task, leaving the PS in charge of
suspend it.
The hST IP stores the information related to all created timer (the timer’s period, callback
function and if it is an auto-reloaded timer or not) in the ”Timer Info list”. Activated timers are
saved in a doubly linked list called ”Timer List”. The Timer List sorts the activated timers by their
expiration time. When a timer expires, the hST IP sends a ”resume” command to the hTM IP
(resumetimer_out) in order to place the timers handler task in ready-to-run state. Also, provides
the timer’s callback function to the PS (addrTimer_out). If the expired timer is an auto-reload
timer, then it is again placed in the Timer list with a new expiration time. In addition to the timer’s
start and ”create” commands, the hST IP allows commands such as timer’s stop (stopTimer_in),
change timer’s period (changePeriod_in), and delete (deleteTimer_in).
The principle is the same as in Task Delay sub-module of hTM IP, sorting the active timers by
ascending order of expiration time. Figure 4.16 depicts the behaviour of the list against expired
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Figure 4.15: Software Timers IP.
values after overflow of the timer.
4.2.6 Synchronization Service
Mutexes, binary semaphores, and count semaphores, are quite similar in terms of imple-
mentation. The hardware Semaphore IP (hSmphr IP) implements a count semaphore that can
be used as a mutex or a binary semaphore. Each semaphore has a number of maximum counts.
If it is a binary semaphore, the semaphore only has one count available.
To create a semaphore, the createSemaphr_in needs to be set. Also, the hSmphr IP receives
the maximum counting value that the semaphore can ”give” (countmax_in) and the number of
counts available in the initialization (countInit_in). Each semaphore has an ID that is provided also
in the creation (semphoreID_in). The inputs take_in and release_in, correspond to the ”take” and
”release” operations, respectively. When one of these inputs is set, the hSmphr IP also receives
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Figure 4.16: Software Timers List.
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Figure 4.17: Semaphore IP.
the semaphore ID (semphoreID_in), and the identification of the task that calls the ”take” or
”release” (taskID_in), as well as its priority (priority_in). Furthermore, the Figure 4.17 illustrates
the I/O of the Semaphore Module.
The hSmphr IP stores the semaphores information (maximum of counts and present value
of releases) in the Semaphore List. If a ”take” occurs the value of releases is decremented. If a
”release” command occurs the value of releases is incremented without exceeding the maximum
value. In case of the counting value is null, meaning that the semaphore cannot perform ”take”
operations, the hSmphr IP suspends the task that request the ”take” operation and inserts the
task in the Waiting List. The waiting list sorts the blocked tasks by their priority. When a ”release”
command is invoked, the semaphore resume the higger priority task that was waiting for a release,
and not the task that was waiting the longest. Each semaphore as an associated waiting list, then
multiple tasks can be waiting for a release. However, a task can not be waiting for more than one
semaphore in an instant.
Figure 4.18 depicts an example of list behaviour when there are three semaphores, with tasks
on hold, and a semaphore with availability to run a ”take” command.
4.2.7 Secure Guest OS modifications
As FreeRTOS was used as the secure guest, it was needed to make some modifications to
it so it will execute using FIQs instead of IRQs. As such, the core interrupt handling code was
modified and the GIC CPU interface configured to signal secure interrupts as FIQs. The latter is
simply done by setting the FIQEn bit in the CPU Interface Control Register (ICCICR).
The major issue with this modifications is the fact that, in the Zynq implementation, FIQs are
non-maskable from the interrupt perspective. It is only set by hardware when certain exceptions
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occur, such as the triggering of a FIQ. This seriously complicates the FreeRTOS interrupt code with
respect to interrupt nesting, as this code originally enables and disables IRQs by masking them
in the I bit of the CPSR. Furthermore, this problem is aggravated by the fact that internally, the
implementation of the yield operation is done through the use of a SVC (supervisor call) instruction
to directly jump to the exception vector and execute the needed yield operations. When using IRQs,
this code assumes their automatic masking when the trap is triggered, which does not happen for
FIQs. Not having FIQs maksed in these critical sections, removes the guarantee for their atomic
execution, which might totally disrupt the correct execution of the RTOS. To solve this, the yield
macro was replaced for a software generated interrupt, namely SGI 0, previously configured as
secure, by writing to the ICDSGIR register of the distributor. As such, the FIQ handling code only
needs to redirect control flow to the yield code (and first acknowledge and end the interrupt) in
case the acknowledge interrupt is ”0”, and proceed normally otherwise. Nesting code however,
becomes permanently ”damaged” as are we not able to unmask and mask FIQs at will, so this
functionality will not be completely available in the pure software version of the secure guest
RTOS.
A final note regarding interrupts in the secure FreeRTOS guest: when configuring them, care
must be taken so that they always have a higher priority than non-secure IRQs. This is simply
done by assigning a priority in the lower half of the spectrum (as ARM interrupt priority scale is
inverted), as TrustZone hardware forces secure software to configure priorities in the higher half
of the spectrum.
4.3 Non-Secure VM (Linux with HDMI video output)
The non-secure world host the general-purpose guest OS, Linux. The massive support com-
munity and user base for this GPOS allows the existence of documentation, software modules
and FPGA reference designs compatible, mitigating the engineering effort. GPOS are useful for
running human-machine interfaces as well as internet-based applications and services. In order
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Figure 4.18: Semaphore Lists.
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Figure 4.19: ADV7511 reference design
to enrich the multimedia support, Analog Devices provides a reference HDL design which contain
support for generating the necessary video and audio as well as support for interfacing as well
as Linux driver for the High-Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) transmitter, ADV7511.
The reference design illustrated in figure 4.19 [HDM18] consists of two independent core
modules. The video part consists of a Xilinx VDMA interface and the ADV7511 video interface.
The ADV7511 interface consists of a 16bit YCbCr 422 (a format of color spaces used as a part of
the color image pipeline in video and digital photography systems) with separate synchronization
signals. The Video Direct Memory Access (VDMA) streams frame data to this core. The internal
buffers of this core are small (1k) and do not buffer any frames as such. Additional resources may
cause loss of synchronization due to DDR bandwidth requirements. The video core is capable
of supporting any formats through a set of parameter registers (given below). The pixel clock is
generated internal to the device and must be configured for the correct pixel frequency. It also
allows a programmable color pattern for debug purposes. A zero to one transition on the enable
bits trigger the corresponding action for HDMI enable and color pattern enable.
The reference design defaults to the 1080p video mode. The video settings can be change.
The (HDMI Core) requires a corresponding pixel clock to generate the video. The reference design
reads 24bits of RGB data from DDR and performs color space conversion (RGB to YCbCr) and
down sampling (444 to 422). If bypassed, the lower 16bits of DDR data is passed to the HDMI
interface as it is. A color pattern register provides a quick check of any RGB values on the monitor.
If enabled, the register data is used as the pixel data for the entire frame.
The audio part consists of a Xilinx DMA interface and the ADV7511 spdif audio interface. The
audio clock is derived from the bus clock. The audio data is read from the DDR as two 16bit
words for the left and right channels. It is then transmitted on the SPDIF frame. The reference
design defaults to 48KHz.
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The ADV7511 driver is implemented as a IP encoder slave driver. In a typical board design
the ADV7511 is not used as a standalone component but rather as a HDMI encoder fronted for
some other devices with a graphics core, like a SoC or a FPGA. Implementing the ADV7511 driver
as a IP encoder slave driver allows to reuse the driver between different platforms which use the
ADV7511.
4.3.1 Non-Secure Guest OS modifications
The Linux runs in the supervisor mode of the non-secure world side. The non-secure VM
is completely isolated from the privileged software running on the secure world side. The main
limitation posed on the OS hosted on the non-secure side is that it can no longer use the TrustZone
features by itself. The virtual architecture is not completely identical to the physical one, but it
is identical to the bare architecture without TrustZone enhancements with an offset due of the
reserved non-secure space. Notwithstanding, all the hardware modules in the reconfigurable
hardware that pertain to the GPOS are declared as non-secure slaves of the secure AXI Master
Bus.
Follow, some of the modifications made after setting the Xilinx original Linux with the default
configuration provided by Analog Devices:
• FIQ stack initialization were removed, due to IRQs being used instead of FIQs, according
to the LTZVisor interrupt model;
• Updates Linux device tree with specific LTZVisor bootargs (e.g. clock frequency, memory
limitation);
• Clean the Filtering_Start_Address_Register, so the DDR start from 0.
Listing 4.2: Offtsets Declaration
SECTIONS {
. = PHY_OFFSET;
.texts : {
_start:
start.o(.text);
start.o(.rodata);
}
. = NS_OFFSET + DTS_OFFSET;
.textd : {
d.tmp(.data);
. = . + 0x1000;
}
. = NS_OFFSET + ZIMAGE_RAMDISK;
.textr : {
r.tmp(.data);
}
. = NS_OFFSET + ZIMAGE_OFFSET;
.textz : {
_start_linux:
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z.tmp(.data);
}
}
After building the modified Linux, the reserved section for the compiled kernel (zimage), the
device tree struct (dts) and the root file system (ramdisk) are declared in the non-secure space.
Listing 4.2 illustrate the linker script file used to declare those offsets.
4.4 LTZVisor Modifications
This section intend to describe some modification made to the original lightweight TrustZone
hypervisor (LTZVisor) code regarding:
• decouple the secure guest, which was tightly entangled with the hypervisor itself being
compiled together as a single image.
• endowing LTZVisor with multi-processing VM support and so the hardware-software VM .
While the secondary core executes in a normal state hosting exclusively the non-privileged
software (i.e. the Linux guest), the primary core executes the privileged real-time guest
in the secure state, scheduling the non-secure guest on this core in the idle period of the
hardware-software RTOS.
Before describing the LTZVisor modifications carried out on this implementation, this section
will delve a little bit deeper on the internal implementation details and build system of the LTZVisor,
for which an overview is given on section 3.4.
LTZVisor achieves its main objective of dual guest execution by carefully assigning as non-
secure only the needed resources for the non-secure guest to execute. This is accomplished
by configuring the TrustZone module registers [Xil14] according to the needs of the non-secure
guest’s peripheral and memory use. Regarding memory, TrustZone segment assignment is done
according to a predefined memory layout, as the non-secure guest must be previously compiled
to execute specifically within the bound of this configuration. Furthermore, registers of the APU
mpcore module, namely the SNSAC (SCU Non-secure Access Control Register) and the ICDISRX
(Interrupt Security Register) registers of the GIC distributor, are configured to assign internal core
components (e.g. the global timer) and non-secure interrupts to this guest, respectively. At the
same time, the core’s GIC interface is configured to signal secure interrupts as FIQs (in the CPU
Interface Control Register or ICCCICR).
LTZVisor code executes in the monitor mode (which is always considered as running in secure
state independently of the NS bit of the CP15 Secure Configuration Register), and performs the
context switch between the non-secure and secure guests. After the aforementioned system
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initialization, the context of both guests is initialized. Then LTZVisor executes the following steps
to execute the context-switch to the secure-guest:
1. Sets the NS bit to secure.
2. Configures the FIQ bit of the SCR to route FIQs directly to FIQ mode (in the secure exception
vector).
3. Restores secure guest context and transfers control flow to it (the first time this occurs, the
hypervisor directly branches to the main function of the non-secure guest).
After this, the core is in completely control of the processor. It may execute until it seems fit.
When entering an idle state it must emit a SMC to trigger a trap to the hypervisor which will then
perform the sequence:
1. Sets the NS bit to non-secure.
2. Configures the FIQ bit of the SCR to route FIQs directly to Monitor mode (in the monitor
exception vector).
3. Restores non-secure guest context and transfers control flow to it.
The non-secure guest will then execute until a FIQ, configured previously by the secure guest,
is triggered. When this happens, the hypervisor acknowledges the interrupt and branches to a
secure guest defined interrupt service routine. After the guest returns, the steps for the secure-
guest context restore are repeated in the whole cycle repeats. This asymmetric scheduling scheme
gives complete control of the system the secure RTOS guest, which will always execute when it
deems fit by accordingly configuring it interrupts.
4.4.1 Secure Co-Design Guest Decoupling
One important aspect of the original LTZVisor implementation is that the secure guest is
compiled with the hypervisor in a single image. This allows the aforementioned direct branches (at
start-up and for interrupt servicing) from the hypervisor to the secure guest, which entangles both
implementations, making the guest’s interrupt servicing and nesting software highly dependent on
the hypervisor. For this reason, the makefile and FIQ routine of the hypervisor were altered so that
the secure guest is compiled completely from the remain system. In this way no direct branches
happen from the hypervisor to the secure guest - both are completely agnostic of each others
implementation. As such the secure guest will be included as a raw binary in the final system
image, in the same way the non-secure guest is. This as two implications in the functioning of
the hypervisor described above:
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• The hypervisor cannot directly jump to the main routine of the secure guest at start-up. It
will instead jump to the reset expection vector entry, which must coincide with the base of
the guest image.
• The hypervisor cannot directly branch to the guest’s interrupt service routine when a FIQ
is triggered while the secure guest executes. Instead, it will be agnostic of the FIQ being
serviced and not acknowledge it but directly restore the context of the secure guest. As of
this moment, the FIQ mask in the CPSR is cleared, and the interrupt is still pending, imme-
diately after the guest is resumed, the hardware will jump to the guests secure exception
vector, which will service the interrupt as normally happens when executing standalone.
4.4.2 Multi-Processing
The adaptation of LTZVisor to a multicore-processing configuration is relatively simple. The
main idea here is that while the primary core behaves as the single-core implementation of LTZVi-
sor, by giving almost full control to the secure RTOS guest and scheduling the non-secure guest
on its idle periods, the secondary core is dedicated to exclusively execute the non-secure guest,
To achieve this, only small modifications are needed at the start-up and initialization code of
LTZVisor, as well as duplicate parts of the context of the non-secure guest. First, the primary core
run all TrustZone configurations as it was in the original version. Then, when the non-secure VM
initialization starts and attempt to initialize the secondary core, the hypervisor first takes place
and executes the needed TrustZone configurations in order to declare the secondary core as non-
secure, before handling execution control to the non-secure guest. Some care is needed also to
initialize some core specific structures such as the GIC CPU interface in both cores.

5. Evaluation
The Chapter 4 has describe the implementation of the TrustZone-assisted Secure Silicon
Co-Design framework. This chapter goes through an extensive evaluation. The implemented
solution was evaluated on a ZedBoard evaluation board targeting a dual ARM Cortex-A9 running
at 667 MHz and 100 MHz on the Series-7 Programmable Logic. This evaluation focused on three
metrics: memory footprint, performance overhead and real-time behaviour.
5.1 Engineering effort
The engineering effort required for the implementation of the developed framework was mea-
sured using the Understand software tool. This tool provide pertinent metric and reports regarding
the developed code. In the context of this thesis, we have focused on the number of lines of code
(LoC) of the TCB of the system (libraries and drivers were not taking in consideration).
Figure 5.1a illustrate the comparison between number of LoC of the LTZVisor and the modified
version for this developed framework. It is noted that there is a reduction in terms of LoC between
hypervisor. This reduction is related to the fact that in this developed version the secure guest is
no longer part of the hypervisor’s TCB.
Figure 5.1b depicts the comparison between number of LoC of FreeRTOS v10.0.1 and the
hardware-assisted developed version, and so the LoC written in HDL language for the developed
hardware modules. It was expected a reduction in terms of LoC in the version developed due
the offloading of several OS services to hardware. It is noteworthy that since this approach rely
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Figure 5.1: Engineering effort results
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on the structure of FreeRTOS and attempt to maintain its architecture, the code refactoring could
never be excessive. Thereupon, the conjunction of software and hardware code presents values
slightly higher than the original version of FreeRTOS.
5.2 Memory Footprint
In order to assess the memory footprint of each software component of the implemented
architecture, we used the size tool of the Arm GNU toolchain. The original and hardware-software
co-design version of FreeRTOS (v10.0.1), as well as the original and modified version of LTZVisor
hypervisor were evaluated without taking in consideration the boot code, libraries and drivers.
Table 5.1 presents the collected measurements. As it can be seen the memory overhead in-
troduced by the hypervisor remains very small, just like the original LTZVisor, i.e., 2816 bytes.
As it can be seen, the hardware-software version of the secure VM RTOS has smaller memory
footprint compared to the original version. This reduction comes from hardware offloading of the
components that caused the most overhead to the real-time operating system.
Table 5.1: TrustSecSiCode memory footprint (bytes)
Software Memory Footprint
.text .data .bss Total
LTZVisor Trust SecSi Code 2816 0 260 3076
LTZVisor 2368 0 512 2880
Hardware-software RTOS 18554 0 120 18674
FreeRTOS v10.0.1 21526 0 360 21886
5.3 Hardware Costs
Since both VMs employ services on the reconfigurable hardware layer, it is worth to mention
the hardware costs for the developed framework. Vivado post-implementation offers a set of
reports regarding timing, power and utilization. Figure 5.2 depicts the Vivado utilization report.
Vivado utilization report parameters indicates the number of lookup tables (LUTs), LUTRAM, flip-
flops (FFs), buffer random access memory BRAM, I/Os and mixed-mode clock manager (MMCM)
of the current design required in order to implement the secure VM hardware RTOS services
(illustrated in grey colour) and the HDMI transmitter module used by the non-secure VM (illustrated
in cyan colour).
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Figure 5.2: TrustSecSiCoDe framework hardware costs
There is not much to point out about the hardware costs pertaining to the HDMI transmitter
because because it is a third-party implementation. Nevertheless, it is relevant to present them
together with the results of the migrated RTOS services towards analysing the overall hardware
costs. The offloaded RTOS services requires a significant amount of LUT and LUTRAM, due to
the fact that in most cases these services are practically list management operations. This lists
are stored in memory resources. In terms of PL resources, the overall system does not have an
excessive consumption of resources available in the evaluated Zynq platform. Since the consumed
resources do not exceed much more than the 20% of resources available in this platform, leaving
enough development space for applications to be developed on top of this evaluation board.
5.4 Performance
The performance evaluation process was split into two different test case scenarios. First,
evaluate the improvements introduced by the implemented hardware-software co-design RTOS
(using the Thread Metrics Suite) as well as the latency deviation over the secure VM (Hardware-
software RTOS). Then, evaluate the overhead over the non-secure VM (GPOS) using the LMBench.
5.4.1 Secure VM (Hardware-Software RTOS)
Thread-Metric Benchmark Suite provides a set of benchmarks to evaluate the RTOS real-time
capabilities. As already described in section 3.5.1, the suite comprises seven benchmarks, eval-
uating the most common RTOS services and interrupt processing: cooperative context switching
(CS); preemptive context switching (PS); interrupt processing (IP); interrupt processing with pre-
emption (IPP); semaphore processing (SP); message passing (MP); and memory allocation and
deallocation (MA). Each benchmark outputs a counter value, the higher the value, the smaller
RTOS impact on the running application.
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Figure 5.3: Thread-Metric benchmarks results
Benchmarks were executed on the original version of FreeRTOS (FreeRTOS Kernel v10.0.1),
and on the hardware-software RTOS version ( Hardware-Software RTOS). In both versions the
interrupts are handled as FIQs. Because either versions are declared as secure guests on the
Trust SecSi CoDe. Figure 5.3 presents the achieved results, corresponding to the average relative
performance (as well as the average absolute performance) of 20 collected samples for each
benchmark. Each sample reflects the benchmark score for a 30 seconds execution time, encom-
passing a total execution time of 500 minutes, per benchmark. In accordance with Figure 5.3
the hardware-software co-design version of FreeRTOS compared to the original version has an
overall better performance. It is also possible to verify that the improvements in memory alloca-
tion and deallocation and message passing benchmarks were not as significant as the remaining
tests. This phenomenon occurs because no messaging or memory allocation service has been
offloaded to the reconfigurable hardware.
The hardware accelerators implemented to support the RTOS are directly related to the task
switching mechanism. This way, to infer the benefits obtained from the hardware approach, the
evaluation and validation was realized by measuring the latency and jitter in the manipulation of
the various kernel data structures. Both hardware-software RTOS and FreeRTOS Kernel v10.0.1
were measure through a specific hardware counter module, called performance monitor unit
(PMU).
Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b illustrate the task switch latencies on the FreeRTOS Kernel
v10.0.1 and on the hardware-software RTOS, respectively. This test measures the latency of
a switch context operation from the idle task to a task with the priority: 0, 7, 15, 23, 31, 39,
47, 55, 63. Also, this test measures the switch latency after on task (with the priorities previous
mentioned) As can be seen on the collected data, the mean latency in the hardware-software
RTOS is significant lower than the original FreeRTOS. More than that, regardless of the priority
that the task has, this operation takes 1200 system ticks. This means hardware-software RTOS
presents more determinism than the original version of FreeRTOS.
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Figure 5.5: xIncrementTick() latency results
Through the results illustrated in the Figure 5.5, was possible to verify that the ”xIncre-
mentTick()” operation is a costly and time consuming procedure. Since, in the developed ap-
proach this procedure was completely moved to hardware, the RTOS processing system will be
entirely released of it and, therefore, the latency is eliminated.
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Figure 5.6: LMBench arithmetic operations latency (lat_ops) benchmark results.
5.4.2 Non-Secure VM (Linux)
LMBench is a widely used suite of micro-benchmarks that measure a variety of important
aspects of system performance, such as latency and bandwidth. The LMBench 3.0 suite includes
more than forty micro-benchmarks within three different categories: bandwidth, latency, and
other. The evaluation was focused on two specific benchmarks:
• lat_ops: Arithmetic operations latency, to evaluate general CPU performance
• bw_mem: Memory operations bandwidth for different blocks size to evaluate the interfer-
ence of the TrustZone Address Space Controller (TZASC);
The presented evaluation exhibit the results taken from four different application scenarios.
For the first scenario, the micro-benchmarks were ran in the native version of Linux (Linux Native).
Second, the micro-benchmarks in virtualized version (TZLinux) without any secure VM executing.
For the third and fourth scenario, the micro-benchmarks were ran with the secure VM configured
with a 1 MHz tick frequency and with 10MHz, respectively. Its worth to mention that no real time
tasks were added to the secure VM. This means, in the case of the implemented hardware-assisted
RTOS will not trigger the timer interrupt since there is no need to context switch. Therefore, for
Chapter 5. Evaluation 67
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
105%
rd wr rdwr cp fwr frd fcp bzero bcopy
R
e
la
ti
ve
 P
e
rf
o
m
an
ce
 (
%
)
Linux Native TZLinux with  1000Hz RTOS
(a) (bw_mem) benchmark results (1KB)
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
105%
rd wr rdwr cp fwr frd fcp bzero bcopy
R
el
at
iv
e 
P
e
rf
o
m
an
ce
 (
%
)
Linux Native TZLinux with  1000Hz RTOS
(b) (bw_mem) benchmark results (128KB)
Figure 5.7: LMBench memory bandwith (bw_mem) benchmark results
the purpose of this evaluation, a real-time task was created, this task simply suspends it self until
next tick. This way the non-secure VM evaluation for the Trust SecSi Code framework can come
closer to a real typical framework use since to run applications in RTOS it is necessary to associate
them with tasks. Presented results correspond to the average relative performance and variation
(as well as the average absolute performance) of the 10 consecutive experiments, encompassing
a total of 1000 samples.
Figure 5.6 presents the achieved results for the arithmetic operations latency benchmark.
The values on top of the bars correspond to the average latency, in nanoseconds. As it can
be seen, the virtualized version of Linux with a 1 MHz tick frequency of the secure VM only
presents an average performance degradation of 3%, when compared to its native execution.
This value is practically uniform among all micro-benchmarks (apart from the small variations
due to the benchmark’s lack of accuracy). For these arithmetic operations latency -benchmarks,
the achieved results do not reflect the real performance penalty, due to the lack of precision. The
relative performance of GPOS at different RTOS tick rates it has an exponential decay behaviour
for the core 0. Despite this it will not happen starvation on the non-secure world side since the
core 1 is reserved for non-secure virtual machine use. Moreover, at 100 µs RTOS tick rate, the
relative performance of one core used by the GPOS is 85%.
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Figure 5.7 presents the achieved results for the memory bandwidth benchmark. The values
on top of the bars correspond to the average memory bandwidth, in megabytes per second
(MB/s). Figure 5.7a and Figure 5.7b depict the assessed results for a memory block size of 2KB
and 128KB, respectively. These memory block sizes were selected with the intention to fit and not
fit within the L1 and L2 cache sizes, respectively. Looking at the two figures, it is clear the relative
performance of the system is practically uniform among all micro-benchmarks, presenting an
average performance degradation of 3% when comparing to the virtualized version of Linux with
the native one.
In summary, the non-secure VM’s performance is inversely proportional to the secure VM’s
tickrate, but only in the primary core. Since the secondary core run exclusively the non-secure
SMP operating system. Thereby the non-secure VM experience lack of performance on one of its
cores (on the primary core to be more precise), which is much better than suffering completely
starvation, which makes the purpose of this guest ineffective.
6. Conclusion
Embedded systems are proliferating at a rapid pace in our everyday life, representing a huge
part of our key infrastructures. The trend nowadays goes towards the consolidation of a wide
range of functions into the same hardware platform, while reducing size, weight, power and cost
(SWAP-C) budget.
Solutions that guarantee the deadlines of real-time tasks, while at the same time, integrating
rich environments for monitoring and network purposes are gaining momentum in embedded
systems field. Virtualization technology allows the co-existence of mixed-criticality systems envi-
ronments on a single physical platform. Hardware virtualization solutions are capable of providing
efficient hypervisors and real-time guarantees. TrustZone-assisted virtualization has been seen
as a promising approach, due to the ubiquitous presence of TrustZone-enabled processors.
Co-designed systems that exploit reconfigurable hardware technology are able to ensure the
rigid real-time constraints of embedded domain. Virtualization solutions that rely on asymmetric
scheduling policy can lead to the starvation over one of the guests. Multi-processing configuration
demonstrate to be a viable solution to prevent the drawback of asymmetric designs.
This thesis proposed the TrustZone-assisted Secure Silicon Co-design framework (Trust SecSi
CoDe). Trust SecSi CoDe is a hardware-software co-design framework for easing the economy
of building the new generation of embedded devices. By bringing together TrustZone technology,
virtualization, multiprocessing, and RTOS acceleration via configurable hardware, that embedded
system developers and hobbyists will find into Trust SecSi CoDe framework a valuable resource
to speed-up the development of current embedded applications on Xilinx Zynq-based devices.
6.1 Future Work
Although the developed framework is already at a good stage of development, there is still
room for improvements and development. A good example is the implementation of an inter-
partition communication (IPC) mechanism using VirtIO [RSPT18].
Our current priority is the implementation of use cases which might demonstrate the full
potential of the framework across different embedded industries. Among existing embedded
industries, we are particularly interested on the development of a demo for the Industrial IoT.
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Figure 6.1 depicts a use case scenario of a conventional smart factory and respective production
facilities. At the heart of the Industrial IoT are the Automation and Industrial Control Systems,
which are computing platforms that monitor and control physical processes. In the presented use
case scenario, the highlighted ICS unit is responsible for monitoring, controlling and connecting
a robotic arm to the Internet. The Trust SecSi Code framework provides all technologies needed
to address such requirements.
Currently, we are developing a rough prototype of such an application with the DOBOT Ma-
gician1. The framework is used to build a system that runs Ubuntu for monitoring (using a QT
GUI), as well as the accelerated RTOS which interfaces with the robotic arm when the buttons
available on the Zedboard are pressed.
Figure 6.1: Trust SecSi Code for Industrial Control Systems.
1https://www.dobot.cc/dobot-magician/product-overview.html
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